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PUTTING DESERT IN ITS PLACE
Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein*
Based on an impressive array of studies, Paul Robinson and his coauthors
have developed a new theory of criminal justice, which they call "empirical de-
sert." The theory asserts that, because people are more likely to be compliant
with a legal regime that is perceived to be morally credible, a criminal justice
system that tracks empirically derived lay views about how much punishment is
deserved is the most efficient way of achieving utilitarian goals, or at least is as
efficient at crime prevention as a system that focuses solely on deterrence and in-
capacitation. This Article describes seven original studies that test the most im-
portant hypotheses underlying empirical desert theory. The authors' conclusions,
which throw doubt on much of empirical desert theory, include the following:
(1) while consensus on the ordinal ranking of traditional crimes is relatively
strong, agreement about appropriate punishments-which arguably is the type of
agreement empirical desert requires in order to work-is weak; (2) the relation-
ship between people's willingness to abide by the law and the law's congruence
with their beliefs about appropriate punishment is complex and not necessarily
positive; further, any noncompliance that results from the law's failure to reflect
lay views about desert is probably no greater than the noncompliance triggered
by a failure to follow lay views about the role utilitarian goals should play in
fashioning criminal dispositions; (3) while the relative crime control benefits ofa
desert-based system and a prevention-based system are hard to evaluate (and are
not directly examined here), people are willing to depart from desert in cases that
do not involve the most serious crimes if they believe that preventive goals can be
achieved in some other way. The Article ends by discussing the implications of
these findings for criminal justice policy, especially with respect to determinate
and indeterminate sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
The age-old debate among criminal law theoreticians over whether desert
or prevention ought to drive criminal justice has taken on a new cast during the
past few years. The old debate featured deontology against utilitarianism: put
simply, should offenders be punished according to their moral blameworthiness
or should concerns about protecting society be the focus of punishment? Nu-
merous thinkers have staunchly staked out positions at opposite ends of the
spectrum, while others have tried to reach some type of compromise between
the two.' But the consistent theme in the debate has been that a theory that. ba-
ses punishment on the offender's degree of culpability is frequently in signifi-
cant tension with the view that punishment should focus on how subsequent of-
fending can be prevented. 2
In the new debate both sides are more optimistic about resolving this ten-
sion, perhaps because both sides are willing to abandon the deontological view
1. For a description of the debate, see Michael Tonry, Introduction to WHY PUNISH?
How MUCH?: A READER ON PUNISHMENT 3, 3 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).
2. See id. at 7 ("The fundamental contrast between the ideas that punishment is mor-
ally justified because people have behaved wrongly and that punishment is morally justified
only when it has good consequences has long existed and most likely always will.").
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of desert. In the new debate the value of a culpability-based punishment system
is no longer assessed through the prism of moral philosophy but rather in terms
of its utility at achieving the goals of the criminal justice system. Thus, where
the two sides differ is not over methodology but over whether crime control
and respect for the law is best achieved through a system focused on desert or
through a prevention-based regime that is sensitive to desert only when ignor-
ing it would have criminogenic impact.
Most of the literature in this new debate has favored the first stance. The
principal proponent of that view has been Paul Robinson, who has coined the
term "empirical desert" to capture the idea that a criminal justice system that
tracks empirically derived societal views of desert may best facilitate the law's
ability to assure compliance with legal prohibitions. 3 Relying on a considerable
amount of research, much of which he has helped conduct, Robinson contends
that "a criminal justice system that distributes liability and punishment in con-
cordance with the citizens' shared intuitions of justice . . .may provide greater
utility than a distribution following the more traditional instrumentalist ap-
proach of optimizing deterrence or incapacitation."A
The competing view is not as well developed, and in fact has yet to be ex-
plicitly articulated. This Article aims to provide that articulation. The theory is
that while liability rules should still depend primarily on desert, punishment
rules that focus on the utilitarian goals of specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation ("individual prevention" goals5 ) are not only superior at accom-
plishing crime prevention but can also usually assuage society's urge for retri-
bution well enough to avoid vigilantism, norm breakdown, and other negative
effects. This Article presents original research that supports this approach to
punishment, which could be called "preventive justice."
Both empirical desert and preventive justice are leery of deontological
theories. Both also try to reconcile retributive instincts with more explicitly
preventive goals. The distinction between the two lies in how they evaluate the
utility of desert. This Article's investigation suggests that empirical desert
exaggerates desert's utility as a crime prevention mechanism while unduly
minimizing the efficacy of preventive justice. When added to the. other possible
deleterious effects of reliance on desert as the linchpin of punishment policy-
effects ranging from unusually harsh sentences to expensive imprisonment
schemes-the unclear preventive payoff associated with empirical desert may
mean that preventive justice is a superior approach from a utilitarian
3. See PAUL H. RoBINsON, DiSTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED How MUcH? 139-40 (2008).
4. Id. at 175-76.
5. These utilitarian goals, which focus on reducing recidivism in individual offenders,
are meant to be distinguished from general prevention goals, the best example of which is
general deterrence. See generally RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 25-37 (3d ed.
2010) (categorizing specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation as "individual pre-
vention" goals, and distinguishing those goals from general deterrence).
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perspective. If so, a sentencing regime that favors broad and flexible disposi-
tional ranges should be favored over one that is centered on desert as defined
by surveys of the public.
Part I of this Article describes empirical desert theory in more detail and
summarizes it in terms of three testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that
societal consensus about punishment exists, at least for "core crimes" such as
homicide and robbery, and that this consensus is based on desert considerations
(the consensus hypothesis). The second hypothesis is that a failure to adhere to
this consensus will induce dissatisfaction with the law, which in turn will in-
crease noncompliance with it (the compliance hypothesis). The third hypothesis
is that the noncompliance produced by a punishment regime that departs sub-
stantially from empirically derived desert will exceed the noncompliance such a
regime would prevent, even if the regime is designed to further utilitarian goals
such as general deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation (the crime control
hypothesis).
Part II reports seven studies that test these hypotheses from various angles.
The first two studies explore the consensus hypothesis. The results of the first
study suggest that to the extent consensus about the ordinal ranking of crimes
exists, it is based as much on utilitarian considerations as on desert.6 And the
findings of the second study indicate that consensus about cardinal, as opposed
to ordinal, punishment is hard to come by even with respect to the most com-
mon crimes, a result that may doom empirical desert's objective of constructing
a punishment system that reflects societal views.7 The next three studies call
into question the compliance hypothesis, because they find little evidence that
divergence from societal views about punishment-whether desert- or utilitari-
an-based-significantly increases willingness to break the law or diminishes
respect for it, especially once the passage of time makes the divergence less sa-
lient.8 Further, to the extent that these studies do find such a relationship, they
suggest-contrary to the third (crime control) hypothesis-that noncompliance
is just as likely when the criminal law departs from utilitarian goals. The final
two studies begin to investigate a counterhypothesis to the crime control hy-
pothesis: that punishment explicitly focused on utilitarian goals can satisfy re-
tributive urges.9 They suggest that information about plausible treatment pro-
grams directly affects assessments of desert and creates a tendency to prefer
indeterminate over determinate sentences. 10
Part III, which discusses the implications of this research, concentrates on
these latter findings. Punishment focused on prevention is unlikely to cause ma-
jor dissatisfaction with the justice system, or more noncompliance with the law,
6. See infra Part II.A. 1.
7. See infra Part II.A.2.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Tables 5-7.
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than it preempts through incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence,II unless
it represents a radical departure from desert (which is most likely in connection
with very serious crimes). Thus, from a utilitarian perspective-the perspective
taken by empirical desert-desert should probably play a secondary role. The
optimal sentencing system from a crime control standpoint is likely to be one
focused explicitly on prevention goals, so long as doing so is not so antithetical
to desert that it creates a real possibility of social disruption.
I. EMPIRICAL DESERT THEORY
Joe has just been convicted of armed robbery. What should happen to him
now? A retributivist-one who thinks desert should drive the punishment deci-
sion-would want Joe's disposition to be proportionate to his culpability, as
measured by the relative gravity of the offense, the blameworthiness of the of-
fender, and the harm to the victim or victims. 12 Most desert theorists would
probably conclude that armed robbery falls between murder and burglary on
the gravity and harm spectra. So if a murderer deserves a twelve-year sentence
and a burglar a two-year term, Joe might receive seven years in prison or an
equivalently punitive disposition, perhaps boosted upward by a couple of years
if he was the mastermind of the heist, or downward by a few years if he ap-
peared to be a bit player in the crime or was cajoled into it.
A utilitarian-one who is interested primarily in crime prevention-might
arrive at a quite different sentence, depending upon how costs and benefits are
calculated. A desert-based sentence for someone like Joe might be unnecessari-
ly long or too short to achieve general deterrence.13 Furthermore, if Joe is a ca-
reer criminal he may require enhanced confinement, whereas if he was simply a
tagalong first-time offender or repents his actions in a way that suggests he will
not reoffend, the utilitarian might significantly reduce or conceivably even es-
chew the confinement that desert theory would require for armed robbery (alt-
hough some form of community supervision would probably be warranted).14
11. As noted earlier, see supra note 5, this Article's references to "preventive" purpos-
es of punishment are meant to focus on the "individual" prevention goals of incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and specific deterrence, rather than general deterrence. The assumption
throughout this Article is that, while some sort of punishment is crucial to deterring crime,
no particular punishment is necessary to ensure that goal. As Michael Tonry summarized the
research of three National Academy of Sciences panels, "[i]maginable increases in severity
of punishments do not yield significant (if any) marginal deterrent effects." Michael Tonry,
Purposes and Functions ofSentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 28 (2006).
12. This is a standard account of the criteria retributivists use in calculating desert.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
13. On the difficulties of assigning sentences based on general deterrence theory, see
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 5, at 21-23.
14. As Herbert Packer put it, "the incapacitative theory is at its strongest for those
who, in retributive terms, are the least deserving of punishment." HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 50-51 (1968).
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If Joe's involvement in the robbery were linked to treatable problems-such as
unemployment, mental disability, or substance abuse-a utilitarian would also
consider rehabilitation programs that would last as long as necessary to remedy
the problem, a period that might be shorter or longer than a desert-based dispo-
sition and which, again, would not necessarily involve confinement. 15
This simple example exposes the tension between desert-based retributive
theory and prevention-oriented utilitarian goals. The best known attempt to
construct a system that diminishes the conflict is Norval Morris's limiting re-
tributivism, which sets sentencing ranges based on relative desert but allows
utilitarian objectives to determine the precise duration of a sentence within the
range.16 Asymmetrical desert, which defines the maximum sentence according
to desert but permits downward departures based on preventive goals, is anoth-
er effort at reconciliation.17 Under these hybrid approaches, Joe might receive a
sentence somewhere between five and nine years (depending on his individual
culpability) or might simply be given a maximum sentence of nine years, with
the precise time of release dictated by the risk of reoffending that he poses.
These hybrids can satisfy many mixed theorists. But they frustrate those
policymakers, scholars, and others who occupy the ends of the spectrum: those
near the desert pole who contend that retribution permits at most a narrow band
of punishment for a given level of culpability,' 8 and those near the utilitarian
pole who believe that desert-based confinement is often counterproductive for
the offender now willing to be law abiding, as well as insufficiently protective
of society when dangerous offenders are released after they have finished the
sentence they "deserve." 19 As Andrew von Hirsch has stated, "[a] patched-
together compromise ... between ideas of prevention and those of equity
would be likely to satjsfy neither those preoccupied with crime prevention, nor
those concerned seriously with questions of justice." 20
15. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 33 (5th ed. 2010) ("The rehabilitation the-
ory would let the criminal go when (and perhaps only when) he had been reformed." (foot-
note omitted)).
16. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59 (1974); see also Richard
S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 363-78
(1997) (describing in detail Morris's theory of limiting retributivism).
17. See K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 138, 155 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) ("For a variety of
reasons (amongst them the hope of reforming the criminal) the appropriate authority may
choose to punish a man less than it is entitled to, but it is never just to punish a man more
than he deserves.").
18. See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Equality, "Anisonomy," and Justice: A Review of
Madness and the Criminal Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1105-06 (1984) (suggesting a range
of two to three years for a first offense of armed robbery).
19. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011,
1051, 1053 (1991) ("[W]hen transformation occurs it is difficult to find a continued justifica-
tion for imposing suffering on that offender.").
20. Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42
MD. L. REv. 6, 16 (1983).
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Enter empirical desert theory. The theory first surfaced in a book Paul Rob-
inson published with John Darley in 1995, entitled Justice, Liability, and
Blame.21 Using artfully crafted crime scenarios that would become the staple of
Robinson's empirical work, the research reported in the book revealed signifi-
cant discrepancies between the liability gradations lay people prefer and those
endorsed in the common law and modem statutory templates like the Model
Penal Code. For instance, contrary to both the common law and the Model Pe-
nal Code, Robinson and Darley's subjects on average wanted to impose liabil-
ity for omissions even in the absence of a duty and also wanted to impose lia-
bility for reckless complicity, but rejected full principal liability for purposeful
complicity. 22
Robinson and Darley argued that both desert theorists and utilitarians
should pay attention to these types of findings. For the first group, Robinson
and Darley suggested, surveys of community sentiment could be "one source of
determining what counts as the just desert" and "should be of considerable
utility" in resolving disputes between policymakers as to the moral intuitions of
their constituencies.23 Meanwhile, they noted, utilitarians might find the work
useful because a substantial gap between community sentiment and the crimi-
nal law could reduce the law's "moral credibility," and thus people's willing-
ness to comply with it, not only in everyday life but also when they become di-
rectly involved in the criminal process as jurors, witnesses, and offenders. 24
Robinson repeated these two points in later work. He has elaborated on the
first point by distinguishing between "deontological desert" and "empirical de-
sert." 25 While only the former version of desert "can give us the truth of what is
deserved, insulated from the vicissitudes of human irrationality and emo-
tions,"26 deontology is also subject to the biases and idiosyncratic intuitions of
philosophers. 27 Thus, "it may be that empirical desert offers the best practical
approximation of deontological desert."
28
21. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
22. Id at 42-50 (omissions study); id. at 96-105 (complicity study); id. at 14-28
(attempt study).
23. Id. at 6, 214.
24. See id. at 6.
25. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deonto-
logical, andEmpirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 148-50 (2008).
26. Id. at 167.
27. See id. at 164 (noting that "moral philosophers simply disagree about just how
[moral blameworthiness] translates into specific punishment in a given case").
28. Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice
as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1089, 1110 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson, Doing Jus-
tice as Controlling Crime]; see also Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in
the Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1831, 1840 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers] (suggesting that
empirically sound research methodologies in social psychology can provide moral philoso-
phers with "more reliable" information about intuitions of justice).
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Robinson has also expanded substantially on his thesis that "the crime-
control power of the criminal law depends in some significant part upon how
well it tracks the community's shared intuitions of justice."29 According to
Robinson, tracking these shared intuitions earns the system moral credibility,
which in turn has several positive effects. A morally credible system, he argues,
is better able to minimize vigilantism by people unhappy with its results,
encourage the citizen cooperation that the criminal process needs to function
efficiently, and "harness the power of stigmatization" as a means of influencing
people's conduct. 30 Such a system also has "a greater chance of gaining com-
pliance in borderline cases where the actual condemnability of the conduct may
be unclear" and influences "the larger public conversation by which societal
norms are shaped."31 Robinson concludes in another piece that "strong argu-
ments suggest greater utility in a distribution based on shared intuitions of jus-
tice than in a distribution based upon optimizing deterrence, rehabilitation, or
incapacitation." 32
Several commentators have challenged these arguments. Many of these
challenges are theoretical in nature. 33 Of more relevance to this Article are the
challenges to the view that empirical desert has strong instrumental effects
apart from the deterrence and incapacitation that inevitably flow from punish-
ment. Douglas Berman suggests that reversal of duly enacted laws based on an
elite's empirical study of lay views, as Robinson apparently proposes, is more
likely to undermine the criminal justice system's credibility than bolster it.34
Others wonder whether society's views about something as complex as
punishment can be reliably ascertained, and how the law should respond to
29. Robinson, Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, supra note 28, at 1107.
30. Id. at 1106.
31. Id.
32. Robinson, The Role ofMoral Philosophers, supra note 28, at 1836.
33. For instance, Mary Sigler disputes the relevance of empirical desert to deontologi-
cal desert, since philosophers are not trying to "measure or describe something as it is," and
argues further that empirical desert's positive nature provides no means of reconciling the
disagreements that, in a democracy, are inevitable. Mary Sigler, The Methodology ofDesert,
42 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1173, 1181, 1185-87 (2011); see also Zachary R. Calo, Empirical Desert
and the Moral Economy of Punishment, 42 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1123, 1131 (2011) ("[E]mpirical
desert ... has no resources for explaining why an offender deserves punishment other than
that doing so achieves [utilitarian] benefits."). Others, pointing to our racist history and
similarly undesirable motivations to punish, have noted that societal views may diverge radi-
cally from deontologically sound prescriptions. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Desert, Deontology,
and Vengeance, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1141, 1149 (2011) ("Punitive passions... can also be
excessive and driven by other less desirable, yet no less common, sentiments such as cruelty,
sadism, inhumanity, and racial hatred and prejudice."). Robinson recognizes this potential
problem and states that empirical desert should not always trump deontological desert
(although he does not provide a methodology for deciding when trumping should occur). See
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 21, at 80, 205.
34. Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American "Revolution in Punish-
ment Theory, " 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2011).
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inevitable changes in those views. 35 Several scholars have called for more
proof bolstering the assertions that there are widely shared intuitions about pun-
ishment and that failing to heed these intuitions will increase social disruption
and noncompliance with the law.36
In this Article we join the latter group in calling for such proof, and for the
first time provide evidence that directly challenges empirical desert theory.37
Given the empirical nature of Robinson's argument, our approach is empirical
as well, and relies as much as possible on the same types of materials that Rob-
inson and his coauthors have used. In an earlier article, one of us proposed ten
hypotheses that test the assumptions underlying empirical desert theory. 38 Here
we reduce these to three: the consensus hypothesis, the compliance hypothesis,
and the crime control hypothesis. 39
35. See Calo, supra note 33, at 1133-34; see also Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of
Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 741, 744 (2000) ("[P]ublic opinion research may fail to
measure accurately the public's fundamental values or 'moral intuitions.' . . . [I]t may be far
more successful in reflecting individuals' erroneous knowledge and distorted attitudes,
which can range enormously depending on demographics and personal experiences.").
36. Cf Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1531, 1551-56 (2010) (discussing "empirical evidence contradicting the central
claim that evaluations of serious wrongfulness do not vary across social conditions or indi-
viduals"); Adam J. Kolber, How to Improve Empirical Desert, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 433, 434,
441-48 (2009) (claiming that Robinson has "cherry-pick[ed] ... intuitions that are elicited at
a particular level of abstraction in ways that hide some of our more passionate intuitions that,
for better or worse, motivate many people"); Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 1165, 1167 (2011) (stating that Robinson's scenarios do not simulate
real crimes and questioning whether a failure to follow desert causes significant "social disu-
tility").
37. Braman et al., supra note 36, provides some empirical evidence that challenges the
consensus hypothesis at the margins, but in the main the attack is conceptual.
38. See Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses About Empirical Desert, 41 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1189 (2011).
39. The ten hypotheses were: (1) that rank ordering of core crimes will vary according
to factors other than desert; (2) that significant disagreement exists about appropriate pun-
ishments for core crimes; (3) that for crimes outside the core, there is significant variation in
both the rank orderings and the appropriate punishment; (4) that "[m]ost departures from
empirical desert will not be noticed by the public"; (5) that those departures that are noticed
will not occasion negative reaction because they are perceived to achieve other legitimate
goals, or (6) will occasion negative reaction only because they depart from goals other than
desert; (7) that criminal laws that depart from empirical desert will not cause noncompliance,
or (8) will cause noncompliance only in connection with the specific laws at issue; (9) that
any noncompliance that does result from departures from empirical desert will be less than
the noncompliance resulting from failure to directly address preventive goals; and (10) that
preventive dispositions can often satisfy desert. Id Hypotheses 1-3 are related to the consen-
sus hypothesis described in the text, hypotheses 5-7 are related to the compliance hypothesis,
and hypothesis 9 is the converse of the control hypothesis. Hypotheses 4, 8, and 10 are not
addressed by the research in this Article, although they are addressed by other research. See




The consensus hypothesis associated with empirical desert theory is that
there is a strong societal consensus about deserved punishment, at least with
respect to core crimes such as homicide, assault, and theft. Significant support
for this hypothesis comes from a 2007 article in which Robinson and Robert
Kurzban canvassed literature showing a surprising degree of consistency, both
in this country and elsewhere, in how subjects ranked the relative severity of
these types of crimes. 40 They also reported their own study, which, they assert-
ed, found an "astounding level of agreement" on the ordinal ranking of a wide
array of different homicide, assault, theft, and fraud offenses. 41 In the 2007 ar-
ticle and elsewhere, Robinson further asserts that this type of agreement is
based on an assessment of desert rather than on factors having to do with dan-
gerousness or deterrence. 42
The compliance hypothesis is that if the criminal law fails to adhere to this
consensus, noncompliance with the criminal law will increase. As noted above,
Robinson argues that, in the wake of such failure, the law's moral credibility
will suffer, and as a result will be diminished in its ability to promote and shape
norms, forestall vigilantism, and enhance cohesion. 43 Initially, Robinson's sup-
port for this hypothesis came largely from the work of Tom Tyler, whose book
Why People Obey the Law reported research finding a strong correlation be-
tween respect for authority and compliance with the law.44 More recently, Rob-
inson has relied on studies that directly explore whether unjust results increase
willingness to flout the law45 and on his own research, conducted with two co-
authors, purporting to show the "disutility of injustice.' 4 6
The crime control hypothesis is that the noncompliance resulting from a
failure to follow desert will be at least as great as the noncompliance that re-
sults from a failure to implement preventive goals directly through a system
40. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions
ofJustice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1848-65 (2007).
41. Id. at 1867-72.
42. See id at 1832; see also Robinson, Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, supra note
28, at 1105 ("When ... asked to assign punishment, [laypersons] don't look to the factors
that determine dangerousness or deterrence, but rather to the offender's moral blameworthi-
ness.").
43. Robinson, Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, supra note 28, at 1107 ("[T]he
crime-control power of the criminal law depends in some significant part upon how well it
tracks the community's shared intuitions of justice.").
44. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 21, at 7 (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990)); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw.
U. L. REv. 453, 471, 474-75 (1997) (citing TYLER, supra).
45. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions ofJustice: Implications for Crimi-
nal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 26 (2007) (citing Janice Nadler, Flouting
the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1417 (2005); Erich J. Greene, Effects of Disagreements Be-
tween Legal Codes and Lay Intuitions on Respect for the Law, at iv-v (June 2003) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with authors)).
46. Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility ofIn-
justice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1940 (2010).
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that ignores empirical desert or treats it as a secondary consideration. 47 Robin-
son has yet to offer any direct support for this proposition; to date, he and other
researchers have focused on the noncompliance effects of what he calls "injus-
tice,'" not on a comparison of those effects to the effects on crime of preven-
tive dispositions that do not follow desert-based formulas. Ideal research testing
this third hypothesis would need to find in the real world or construct in the
laboratory desert and utilitarian regimes in their pure form, and then measure
their efficacy at "crime control"-a term that, for Robinson, entails prevention
not only of criminal law violations but also minimization of both civil disobe-
dience and the deterioration of norms. 49
The project reported in this Article is designed to probe each of these three
hypotheses more deeply. While the research underlying empirical desert is gen-
erally sophisticated, it fails to test fairly the impact of utilitarian considerations
on lay decisions about punishment. When those considerations are injected into
the research agenda, a different sense about all three hypotheses begins to
emerge. To the extent consensus about punishment exists, its contours look
quite different when risk-related factors are thrown into the mix. Similarly, to
the extent noncompliance can result from failing to adhere to punishment con-
sensus, it is just as likely to occur when the law ignores preventive objectives
as when it ignores desert. In any event, our research also leads to the conclusion
that both the consensus and the compliance hypotheses are only weakly sus-
tained. Finally, our research suggests that the best way to reconcile the tension
between desert and preventive considerations may well be to focus primarily on
the latter rather than the former. From a utilitarian perspective, a system aimed
at prevention, only loosely constrained by desert, may well be optimal.
II. THE RESEARCH
To test the consensus, compliance, and crime control hypotheses, we con-
ducted seven studies. Like previous studies on empirical desert, all are based on
survey data, not field research. With two exceptions, the sample populations
were solicited via the Internet and answered our ueries online. All of the sam-
ples were reasonably demographically diverse. In large part, the results of
these studies fail to support the three hypotheses.
47. See, e.g., id. at 1948 ("The shift to a desert distribution-specifically, empirical
desert-will not seriously undermine the criminal justice system's crime-control effective-
ness, and indeed may enhance it .... ).
48. See, e.g., id. at 1947 ("[A] distribution of liability and punishment that tracks lay
intuitions of justice would significantly reduce the injustice now present.").
49. See id. at 1948.
50. As revealed below in Appendix D, except for Study 5 (which used law students)
and Study 7C (which did not include any African Americans), our participants represented a
wide range of races, ages, political affiliations, income categories, and education. Note,
however, that in one of our samples (used in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 6), the gender split (63%
male, 37% female) was far from even. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in
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A. Hypothesis I: Consensus
Robinson and Kurzban's results reporting consensus on the ordinal ranking
of core crimes relied on twenty-four simple fact patterns depicting the offend-
er's act and mental state. 51 Here are two examples, from opposite ends of the
severity spectrum:
The owner has posted rules at his all-you-can-eat buffet that expressly pro-
hibit taking food away; patrons can only take what they eat at the buffet. The
owner has set the price of the buffet accordingly. John purchases dinner at the
buffet, but when he leaves he takes with him two whole pies to give to a
friend.
John kidnaps an 8 year-old girl for ransom, rapes her, then records the
child's screams as he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording
to her parents to induce them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they
pay as directed, John strangles the child to death to avoid leaving a witness. 52
When asked to indicate the relative amount of punishment John deserved
in twenty-four such scenarios, virtually all of Robinson and Kurzban's subjects
ranked them in the same order.53 From these results and their survey of other
research, 54 Robinson and Kurzban concluded that "human intuitions of justice
about core wrongdoing ... are deep, predictable, and widely shared."55
Robinson and Kurzban also imply that these intuitions about punishment are
based on blameworthiness and nothing else.56 In another work, Robinson
makes the latter point even more explicitly: "Laypersons see punishment as
something that is properly imposed according to desert, that is, blameworthi-
ness. When ... asked to assign punishment, they don't look to the factors that
determine dangerousness or deterrence, but rather to the offender's moral
blameworthiness." 57
All of this may be true, but Robinson's empirical research does not clearly
establish it. Note in particular two aspects of Robinson and Kurzban's
assessing "ordinary" citizens' views about punishment, see Denno, supra note 35, at 747-58,
762-64 (arguing, in the course of discussing a Robinson and Darley study, that various
demographic variables, including race, gender, education, and political views can "substan-
tially impact . . . results").
51. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 40, app. A at 1894-98 (describing scenarios).
52. Id. app. A at 1894, 1898.
53. Id. at 1869-71.
54. Id. at 1848-65.
55. Id. at 1892. Robinson and Kurzban also suggest that, given the depth of this
agreement, it is "unrealistic to expect the population to all 'rise above' its desire to punish
wrongdoers, or to expect the government to 'reeducate' people away from their interest in
punishing wrongdoers." Id.
56. Id. (referring to "intuitions of justice" solely in terms of blameworthiness); see al-
so John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 659, 659 (2000) (reporting a
study finding that desert predominates over incapacitative concerns).
57. Robinson, Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, supra note 28, at 1105.
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methodology. First, as illustrated by the two examples given above (and ten
other scenarios reproduced in Appendix A), the information given to their
survey participants consisted solely of facts about John's conduct and his
mental state. In other words, in deciding how scenario-punishments should be
ranked, the subjects were not provided any information that might be relevant
to utilitarian concerns-information about John's relative risk or treatability,
for instance-but instead were given only those facts most relevant to retribu-
tive judgments. Second, Robinson and Kurzban framed the punishment ques-
568tion in terms of what John "deserve[d]," which again strongly suggested to
the subjects that they were to consider only desert, not utilitarian factors, in
coming to their conclusions about punishment.59
We wondered whether the rankings that Robinson and Kurzban obtained
would persist if people were given additional facts that were not as closely tied
to blameworthiness. Thus, in the first study that we report below, our hypothe-
sis, contrary to Robinson's assertion, is that people asked to assign punishments
think about many other factors besides desert when given the chance. And if
that is true, then either the consensus about ordinal rankings might not be as ro-
bust as Robinson and Kurzban posit, or any consensus that does exist might rest
as much or more on utilitarian concerns. (Whether it is true, as Robinson and
Kurzban assert, that punishment assigned on utilitarian grounds has nothing to
do with "justice" is a topic we defer until Part III.)60
Furthermore, consensus about ordinal ranking does not mean there is con-
sensus about the precise punishment meted out in particular cases. Robinson
does not contest this commonsense assertion and, indeed, some of his earlier
research supports it.61 Nonetheless, we felt it was important to investigate
further, in the second study reported below, the nature of this dissensus over the
appropriate absolute punishment because of the interaction of Robinson's con-
sensus hypothesis with his compliance hypothesis. The latter hypothesis states
that dissatisfaction with criminal punishments can lead to greater noncompli-
ance with the law. Presumably people can be dissatisfied not only with the or-
dinal ranking of crimes within a given system, but also with the absolute
58. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 40, app. A at 1898 (describing instructions to
subjects).
59. Similar comments can be made about the study that Robinson conducted with John
Darley and Kevin Carlsmith, which purported to find that desert, not dangerousness, is the
primary determinant of people's judgments about punishment. See Darley et al., supra note
56, at 659, 663 (describing the instructions given to survey participants and the conclusions
from their study); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1190 & n.6 (criticizing the study).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 154-161.
61. See ROBINsoN & DARLEY, supra note 21, app. A at 226 (reporting that partici-
pants' punishment choices resulted in standard deviations of over 3.50 in 20% of the
presented scenarios); see also Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convict-
ed Offenders: An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 223, 223 (1980) (re-
porting a study that obtained agreement about "relative severity of sentences to be imposed
... but disagreement over the absolute magnitude of these sentences").
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punishment that is imposed after conviction. If there is widespread disagree-
ment as to the latter, the empirical desert project may be in trouble from the
start because there is no societally accepted baseline to which the criminal
justice system can adhere even if it wants to track lay views on punishment.
1. Study 1: Is there consensus about the ordinal ranking of crimes?
Methodology. Our first study made use of twelve scenarios drawn from the
twenty-four Robinson and Kurzban developed for their study. We administered
these twelve scenarios (described in Appendix A) to 530 demo raphically di-
verse subjects whom we contacted through an online service. Our control
group, consisting of just under half the subjects (264), received the twelve sce-
narios unchanged. Our experimental group, consisting of the other 266 sub-
jects, received the same twelve scenarios but with six of them modified to re-
flect utilitarian considerations. Thus, in a scenario involving a T-shirt theft, the
experimental subjects were told, "After John is caught, he becomes remorseful.
He pays the owner for the T-shirt and apologizes." In a scenario involving theft
of a drill, they were told, "John has previously served time for one other, simi-
lar theft," and in the scenario involving an assault at a football game they read
that "John goes home, realizes he acted rashly, and signs up for an anger man-
agement therapy program that he successfully completes." Appendix A de-
scribes the manipulations in full.
All of these manipulations were designed to introduce factors having to do
with relative dangerousness or treatability-utilitarian considerations-into the
experimental group's calculus. It might be argued that at least some of these
manipulations (for instance, the expression of remorse in the T-shirt theft sce-
nario or the prior crime in the drill theft scenario) are factors relevant to desert
analysis as well.63 However, Robinson himself considers apology, remorse,
restitution, bad character, and postoffense changes in behavior to be "extra-
62. This Study and Studies 2, 3, and 6 made use of the eLab, run by Vanderbilt Uni-
versity's Owen Graduate School of Management. As indicated on eLab's website, "eLab
researchers have leveraged use of a diverse international consumer panel to conduct cutting-
edge research through robust web-based experiments and surveys." ELAB AT VANDERBILT
UNIV., http://elab.vanderbilt.edu (last visited Dec. 19, 2012). The demographics for the sam-
ples are found in Appendix D, below. The control and experimental demographics are not
reported independently because they are essentially the same here and in the other studies
reported in this Article.
63. On the relationship of remorse to retribution, see Michael Wenzel et al., Retribu-
tive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 378 (2008) (distinguishing retri-
bution as backward-looking and remorse as restorative). On the relationship of prior criminal
acts to retribution, compare ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS
AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 88-91 (1985) (arguing that repeat
offenders deserve somewhat greater punishment), with GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRiMINAL LAW 460-66 (1978) (questioning whether a prior record should increase an of-
fender's culpability to any degree).
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legal punishment factors" that are at best tangential to desert.64 Even if a ma-
nipulation is as consistent with desert as it is with prevention, any deviation
from a purely desert-based punishment that it produced would, at the least,
leave unclear whether desert is the dominant basis for ascribing punishment
that Robinson says it is. Further parsing of the effect attributable to particular
manipulations is discussed below.65
To make the survey participants' jobs easier, we gave them the twelve sce-
narios in pairs, with each pair in the experimental group including one manipu-
lated scenario (for the pairings, see Appendix A). We then asked each subject
to indicate which offender within the pair should receive the most punishment.
We expected that the manipulations given to the members of the experimental
group would affect the extent to which their ordinal ranking of the pairs corre-
sponded with the rankings obtained in Robinson and Kurzban's study.
Results. Our expectations were partially met. As indicated in the third col-
umn of Table 1, our control group-the group that received scenarios identical
to those used by Robinson and Kurzban-overwhelmingly ranked the pairs in
the same order as Robinson and Kurzban's subjects, thereby confirming the re-
66
sults of their study. But as the last column of Table 1 illustrates, the majority
of the subjects in the experimental group reversed the ranking in three of the six
pairs (involving thefts and assaults). Moreover, in one of the three remaining
pairs (involving petty theft), the percentage of experimental subjects who
ranked the scenarios differently from both Robinson and Kurzban's group and
our control group increased from 6% to 41%. In the final two pairs, neither the
ranking nor the percentage willing to change ranking changed appreciably,
although in both, the small change that did occur was in the direction we
64. Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness,
Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in As-
sessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REv. 737, 739 (2012) (listing as "extralegal pun-
ishment factors" apology, remorse, history of good or bad deeds, public acknowledgement of
guilt and various other factors that "go beyond the factors that the criminal law formally rec-
ognizes" because they are not "desert-based factors" having to do with the "seriousness of
the harm or the evil of the offense and an offender's culpability and mental capacity"); see
also Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 168
(1985) ("Factors dealing with the present, such as the defendant's social or economic status,
repentance and desire to make restitution, or factors dealing with the future, such as the de-
fendant's predicted dangerousness, rehabilitation, and recidivism, are not truly compatible
with pure desert sentencing.").
65. See infra text following note 68.
66. The left-hand column of Table 1 ranks the crimes in the same order as Robinson
and Kurzban's subjects did. However, contrary to Robinson and Kurzban's findings, see
Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 40, at 1868-69 & tbl.1, in our study the average sentence
for the microwave theft slightly exceeded the average sentences for both the assault at the
store and the assault at the football game. The microwave theft scenario was also one of the
two unmanipulated scenarios (the other involving assault at a store) that produced a different
average sentence (slightly lower) in the experimental group compared to the control group.
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predicted. Of note, these pairs involved the most serious crimes, with all four
scenarios describing homicides.
TABLE 1
Average Sentences and Ordinal Ranking of Twelve Paired Crime Scenarios
(italics indicate reversed rankings between control and experimental groups)
Control Group Ranking Experimental Group
Ranking


















Death by pitbull* (hide
dogs)




Rape and killing of child









































dition. Only the experimental group
actually received the manipulated scenario.
t "% Ranking Crime >" means the percentage of survey participants who consid-
ered the indicated crime to be more blameworthy than the other crime in the pair.
These results show, consistent with other research in this vein,67 that when
people make decisions about relative punishment they are willing to consider
67. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime: A Multidimensional
Analysis with Implications for Law and Psychology, 38 McGEORGE L. REv. 629, 649 (2007)
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more than desert. This is especially so when the crimes are minor or mid-level
felonies. The finding that people are willing to consider relative risk, relative
treatability and other "extralegal" factors undermines Robinson's thesis that de-
sert, defined in terms of blameworthiness at the time of the crime, is the only or
even the principal determinant of society's views on ordinal ranking of these
sorts of crimes.8
Although we did not include enough scenarios to allow us to investigate
the type of utilitarian factors that have the most impact on crime rankings, of
interest is that the manipulated scenarios that occasioned the most dramatic dif-
ference between our results and Robinson and Kurzban's involved, in order of
impact, a prior crime (56% change), a willingness to undergo treatment (38%),
an apology and restitution (35%), and a vow to recidivate (32%). Thus, accord-
ing to our results, both facts that increase risk and facts that reduce it have sig-
nificant influence on punishment decisions. However, in the two pairs involv-
ing homicides, facts that appear to increase risk had very little impact,
suggesting that desert is much more influential in this type of case.
While we found that most of the rankings changed significantly when utili-
tarian factors were added to the scenarios, we also found a fair amount of con-
sensus within both the control and experimental groups, albeit not quite as
much as Robinson and Kurzban did. Robinson and Kurzban obtained a 0.88
Kendall coefficient, indicating an extremely high level of agreement about the
ordinal ranking of the twenty-four scenarios. For the twelve scenarios that we
used in this study, we obtained a 0.836 coefficient for the control group and a
0.816 coefficient for the experimental group, 69 likewise showing that when
people are given the same facts-whether relevant to desert, risk, or both-they
tend to arrive at similar conclusions about relative punishments.
(reporting a study finding that "people may agree about how serious a crime may be, but not
why it is so serious"); Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Restoration and Retribution:
How Including Retributive Components Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice Pro-
cedures, 19 Soc. JUST. RES. 395, 411, 423 (2006) (finding that subjects assigned reduced
sentences to offenders who successfully completed restorative procedures but also finding
that subjects insisted on some punitive prison for serious offenses). One review of public
opinion surveys circa 2000 that looked at data about public attitudes toward both relative and
absolute punishment concluded that "the central tendency in public opinion is to be punitive
and progressive. . . . In short, do justice, protect society, and reform offenders." Francis T.
Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 60
(2000) (capitalization altered).
68. Robinson's own research verifies this point. See Robinson et al., supra note 64, at
825 (summarizing studies finding that "there is broad support for the use of some [extralegal
punishment factors] in determining punishment"). It is not clear how he reconciles these re-
sults with his statement that people base their punishment decisions on desert.
69. Like Robinson and Kurzban, we calculated the Kendall coefficient, which ranges
from 0, indicating no agreement, to 1, indicating complete agreement or concordance. We
did not run statistical significance tests on the differences between our results and theirs be-
cause we did not have access to their raw data.
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2. Study 2: Is there consensus about the appropriate punishment for
crimes?
Methodology. While our subjects did tend to agree about ordinal ranking,
consensus disappeared in both the control and experimental groups when the
question shifted to the specific punishments for the scenarios. In Study 2 we
directed the same subjects involved in Study 1 to assign punishment in each of
the twelve scenarios they read, using a scale that allowed them to select speci-
fied punishments ranging from no liability to the death penalty. In all, the sub-
jects were able to choose from thirty different punishment options on this
scale. 70
Results. On the assumption that, with this many options, disagreement
would be fairly substantial, we decided that the coefficient analysis relied on in
Study 1 was not the best way to measure the degree of consensus. Instead we
used the simplest method of discerning variance within a sample population,
the standard deviation. Generally speaking, the larger the standard deviation,
the wider the dispersion-in this case, the wider the dispersion of punishment
choices. 71 As the two "standard deviations" columns in Table 2 indicate, the
lowest standard deviation for any of the twenty-four scenarios (the twelve read
by the control group and the twelve read by the experimental group) was 2.903,
and only two other standard deviations were below 3. Four of the standard de-
viations were above 7, six above 4, and the remaining eleven ranged from
3.048 to 3.949. Note that the eight scenarios involving homicides (four each for
the control and experimental groups) were all associated with very high stand-
ard deviations (ranging from 3.7 to 7.2); thus, although Study 1 found con-
sistency in the ordinal ranking of these crimes, disagreement within the control
and experimental groups about specific punishments for these same crimes was
remarkably high.
Two other measures of punishment agreement are reported in Table 2. The
"range within two standard deviations" columns depict, for the control and ex-
perimental groups respectively, the range of punishments within two standard
deviations. Because this range reflects the choices of only about 95% of the
participants, 72 it is less affected by any "irrational" outliers. Note that even for
the lesser crimes, this range is fairly significant (for instance, for the theft of the
pie, from no liability to four years) and for the more serious crimes it is often
70. The punishment options were: not liable, liable but no punishment, one day, two
weeks, two months, six months, one year through fifteen years in one-year increments, twen-
ty through fifty years in five-year increments, life sentence, and death penalty.
71. 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TEsTIMONY, app. B at 252 (2005) ("The [standard deviation] indicates
how far a typical element deviates from the average.").
72. See id. at 204 n.4 ("[W]hen the distribution follows the normal curve, about 68%
of the data will be within one standard deviation of the mean, and about 95% will be within
two standard deviations of the mean."). Our distributions were normal.
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huge (for instance, for the death of the baby in the car, from two weeks to the
death penalty). Finally, the "% at Mode" columns indicate that, except for the
two most serious and two least serious crimes, the percentage of subjects who
chose the modal sentence fell between 9% and 25%, suggesting only a minimal
central tendency in the results (although, as noted, the large number of choices
reduces the likelihood that a high percentage of participants would pick the
same sentence). The bottom line, not surprisingly, is that people vary widely in
their assessments about specific punishments, whether they are focused on de-
sert (as with the control group) or are given additional factors relating to dan-
gerousness and treatability (as with the experimental group).
TABLE 2
Standard Deviations, Range Within Two Standard Deviations, and Modes on
Punishments Assigned to Twenty-Four Scenarios
Control Group Experimental Group
Stand. Range w/in 2 % at Stand. Range w/in 2 % at
Dev. Stand. Dev.* Mode Dev. Stand. Dev.* Mode
Scenarios



















3.459 0 to 6 years 23.1 3.933 0 to 6 years 40.6
3.829 0 to 8 years 19.2 2.903 0 to 7 years 21.9
3.474 0 to 8 years 19.9 3.770 0 to 8 years 25.2
3.470 0 to 7 years 25 2.993 0 to 6 years 23.2
3.109 0 to 6 years 18.8 2.921 0 to 5 years 18.3
4.284 0 to 12 years 19.8 4.377 0 to 12 years 22.2
4.483 0 to 13 years 17.8 4.479 0 to 13 years 17.8
7.133 1 day to
death
7.373 2 weeks to
death
4.405 13 years to
death
3.749 15 years to
death
14.9 7.172 0 years to
death
14.5 7.259 2 weeksto
death
55.7 5.524 10 years to
death






* "0" means either no liability or liability but no punishment.
t Manipulated scenario in experimental condition.
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This conclusion could derail empirical desert theory at an early stage. For
empirical desert to work as Robinson imagines it, consensus is probably most
important not with respect to ordinal rankings-the focus of Robinson and
Kurzban's research-but with respect to specific punishments. 73 Robinson
suggests that once the "endpoint" for the maximum possible punishment is de-
cided-whether it be the death penalty, life without parole, or twenty years-
the ordinal rankings he and others have discovered will establish the hierarchy
that descends from there.74 In other words, if the maximum punishment for any
crime is set at the death penalty (as is true in over thirty states) or life without
parole (as it is in every other state but one),75 the crime or crimes viewed as
most serious by the public would receive that penalty and the remaining crimes
would be assigned lower penalties according to their rank order. Yet as sig-
naled by the vociferous debates about the propriety of capital punishment, sen-
tences of life without parole, and even twenty-year terms, 6 the endpoint can be
the crucial factor in determining people's opinions about the criminal justice
system. So it is probable that the divergence between lay views and the crimi-
nal justice system that is most likely to be noticed by and bother laypeople is
the precise punishment meted out in a given case, not whether the punishment
fits within some nuanced hierarchy of which they are unlikely to be aware. 77
The first type of divergence, our research shows, is likely to be quite signifi-
cant.
B. Hypothesis II: Compliance
Given this significant range of disagreement about appropriate punish-
ments, constructing a criminal justice system that reflects widespread societal
consensus about those punishments will be very difficult, even with respect to
the so-called "core crimes" that are the subject of Studies 1 and 2, much less
73. See Kolber, supra note 36, at 450 ("[I]t seems unlikely that a person will care very
much if the penalty for grand theft is a little higher or lower than the penalty for a minor bat-
tery if penalties for all offenses are an order of magnitude higher or lower than where he
thinks they should be.").
74. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 45, at 33-34.
75. See Life Without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/life-without-parole (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (indicating
33 states with the death penalty, 16 states with a maximum sentence of life without parole,
and Alaska with neither).
76. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 139 (1976) (arguing for a five-year
maximum sentence for all but the worst murders); Cullen et al., supra note 67, at 10, 15, 17-
18, 20 (discussing widespread disagreement among the public over the death penalty and
three strikes laws).
77. Robinson implicitly recognizes this point in the studies he conducted on the com-
pliance hypothesis, which tested people's reaction to specific sentences, not discrepancies in
ordinal rankings. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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non-core crimes such as pollution, tax evasion, and abortion.7 8 According to
Robinson's next hypothesis, this disconnect with societal views about punish-
ment (which to him should be focused on desert) could have significant non-
compliance effects. Deviation from desert, he states, "undermines the criminal
justice system's moral credibility and thereby undermines its crime-control ef-
fectiveness" because it
undermines [the system's] power of stigmatization, increases the chances of
vigilantism, promotes resistance and subversion rather than the cooperation
and acquiescence required by the criminal justice system, undermines compli-
ance in borderline cases where the condemnatory nature of the offense may be
ambiguous, and reduces the criminal justice system's influence in the public
conversation by which societal norms are shaped. 79
Robinson originally relied on the research of Tom Tyler to support these
types of assertions, but doing so involved a bit of a stretch. In his seminal work,
Why People Obey the Law, Tyler did find that people's willingness to comply
with the law is related to the perceived legitimacy of the authorities promulgat-
ing the law, which in turn is based at least in part on the extent to which the law
that the authorities promulgate is consistent with people's views about what the
law should be.80 But when Tyler stated that "[t]he most important normative
influence on compliance with the law is the person's assessment that following
the law accords with his or her sense of right and wrong" (a passage cited by
Robinson), 81 he was referring principally to the person's sense of right and
wrong with respect to the particular law in question. 82 Most other research in
this area is similarly limited in its conclusions.83
Tyler's work, read closely, stands for a somewhat different proposition
than Robinson suggests. As Tyler has stated in more recent writing, obedience
78. Robinson and Kurzban acknowledge, based on other studies they conducted, that
"true disagreements do exist for intuitions about wrongdoing outside the core of physical
aggression, unconsented-to takings, and deception or deceit in exchanges." Robinson &
Kurzban, supra note 40, at 1880; see also id at 1880-90 (reporting significant disagreement
on ranking of marijuana possession, cocaine possession, prostitution, a third theft, abortion,
and rape, among other crimes).
79. Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 1948.
80. TYLER, supra note 44, at 45-46, 64.
81. Robinson & Darley, supra note 45, at 25 (alteration in original) (quoting TYLER,
supra note 44, at 64).
82. See TYLER, supra note 44, at 64.
83. Several of these studies are reported in Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 2011-16.
See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 2 LAW &
POL'Y Q. 61, 70 (1980) (finding that people who disagreed with speeding and marijuana pos-
session laws are much more likely to violate those laws); Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and
Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY
TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 259, 276, 282 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (find-
ing that news about acquaintances being treated unfairly by the IRS increased willingness to
evade taxes); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. Soc.
REv. 442, 457 (1976) ("When public sentiment in general disapproves [of] a given offense, it
is relatively unlikely to occur.").
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to the law "is not linked to either the favorability or fairness of the decisions
made or policies pursued by legal authorities. Rather, legitimacy is linked to the
justice of the procedures by which the police and courts implement the law."84
In other words, according to Tyler, overall compliance with the law may be un-
dermined more by procedural injustice than by substantive injustice.85 Indeed,
even in his original work Tyler stated that "[p]eople generally feel that law
breaking is morally wrong, and that they have a strong obligation to obey laws
even if they disagree with them." 86
Janice Nadler has conducted research that more directly supports the com-
pliance hypothesis, which she reported in an article entitled Flouting the Law.87
In one experiment, she gave two groups of subjects six newspaper stories. For
both groups, three of the stories were unrelated to legal issues. But the remain-
ing three stories differed between the two groups, by depicting legislation that
either unfairly or fairly deprived citizens of property or infringed their rights.88
She then asked the subjects to indicate on a "Likelihood of Criminal Behavior
Questionnaire" the probability that they would commit eight different crimes,
including parking violations, speeding, and illegally copying software.8 9 She
found that the group exposed to the unfair stories was significantly more likely
to contemplate noncompliance with the law than the group exposed to the fair
stories. 90 In a second study involving another set of subjects, she described two
versions of an actual case: one in which the criminal justice system did not
84. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 273 (2006) (new afterword to 2006
reprinting).
85. See Jaime L. Napier & Tom R. Tyler, Does Moral Conviction Really Override
Concerns About Procedural Justice? A Reexamination of the Value Protection Model, 21
Soc. JusT. RES. 509, 509 (2008) (contesting the notion that procedural justice concerns are
trumped by "moral mandates"). The third study reported by Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig
in The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 46, at 2016-23, also may have focused on the effect
of attitudes about procedural, rather than substantive, justice. This study involved an analysis
of data from a 2000 survey entitled Public Opinion on the Courts in the United States. The
measure Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig used to determine satisfaction with the criminal law
was the participants' answer to the question "how well [do] you think the courts in your
community handle" violent, drug, and juvenile cases? See DAvID B. ROTTMAN ET AL.,
PUBLIC OPINION ON THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2000, app. A at 1-2, available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/file?comp=none&study=3864&ds=1 &fileid=892958
(subscription required). That type of question could trigger reactions based on procedural
fairness as well as, or instead of, reactions based on case outcomes. Even if respondents
chose to answer this question with only substantive outcomes in mind, however, the survey
does not reveal the grounds on which substantive outcomes were judged-desert, utilitarian
factors, or both.
86. TYLER, supra note 44, at 64.
87. Nadler, supra note 45, at 1399.
88. Id. at 1411-13.
89. Id. at 1413-14. In addition to the subjects who read the newspaper stories, Nadler
also administered the questionnaire to a control group that did not read any of this material.
Id. at 1411.
90. Id at 1415-16.
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impose punishment even though most people would agree that some punish-
ment was warranted, and another in which the perpetrator was punished.9'
Nadler again found that the group exposed to the unjust hypothetical was sig-
nificantly more likely to ignore or nullify unrelated criminal prohibitions than
the group exposed to the just hypothetical.92
Nadler's studies suggest that dissatisfaction with particular cases, whether
they involve excessive harshness or excessive lenience, can affect compliance
with other laws. As she puts it, "specific instances of perceived injustice in the
legal system can lead to diminished deference to the law generally." 93 But
Nadler also reported a third study, one that controlled for gender, that came to a
different conclusion; specifically, she found diminished deference among men
who received a fair/just hypothetical compared to those who read an un-
fair/unjust hypothetical.94 Nadler conjectured that this result might be due to a
"moral credentialing" effect. In other words, people who perceive the law to be
just might feel liberated to commit acts they would normally avoid.95 Nadler
ultimately concluded that "[i]t is undoubtedly false that perceived injustice in
the legal system leads to greater willingness to break the law for all people, in
all circumstances, at all times" and called for further research.96
In two studies reported in The Disutility of Injustice, Robinson, Geoffrey
Goodwin, and Michael Reisig pursue that goal, using as prompts actual cases
implementing punishment schemes that they conjecture are grossly dispropor-
tionate to lay views about desert, such as three strikes laws, strict liability
crimes, and criminalization of regulatory violations. 97 In the first study, Robin-
son and his coauthors found that research subjects who were given scenarios
depicting such schemes generally imposed a much lower sentence than the sen-
tence actually meted out in the case described by the scenario.98 More relevant
to the compliance hypothesis, the first study also found that, after being told of
the actual sentences that were imposed in these cases, the subjects indicated
that they were significantly less willing to comply and cooperate with the law
than they had been before they learned of the sentences. Specifically, Robinson
et al. found that their subjects were less likely to endorse various punishments
imposed by the criminal justice system, to report crimes to the authorities, or to
91. Id. at 1424.
92. Id. at 1417, 1423-24.
93. Id. at 1439.
94. Id. at 1420-21.
95. Id. at 1421 ("The theory of moral credentialing holds that people feel licensed to
act on questionable motives when they have previously established their credentials as a per-
son of pure motives."). In this study, male subjects who read the fair stories may have felt
that they established their pure motives by agreeing with stories' content. See id at 1421-22.
96. Id. at 1440.
97. See Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 1999-2000, app. C at 2031-32.
98. Id. at 2002, app. C at 2031-32.
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correct injustices. 99 The latter attitudes were measured by eight queries that the
authors called "Questions on the Effect of the Criminal Justice System's Moral
Credibility" (which this Article will refer to as the Moral Credibility Scale) that
were administered to the subjects both before and after they read the cases. 100
Worried about the possibility that the subjects in this study changed their
answers on the Moral Credibility Scale because they believed they were ex-
pected to do so after learning about the actual sentences imposed, the authors
conducted a second study using a "between-subjects" design. 01 Consistent
with the results of the first study, the Moral Credibility Scale responses from
those exposed to the aberrant sentences indicated less willingness to endorse
other criminal justice system dispositions and cooperate with authorities than
the responses from a group that read cases corresponding more closely to em-
pirically derived desert. 102
These two studies in The Disutility of Injustice provide the most robust
support to date for the compliance hypothesis. A strength of these studies was
that the scenarios given to the experimental groups were based on actual cas-
es. 103 But it should also be noted that the cases chosen all involved particularly
draconian or abnormally lenient sentences. For instance, in one case given to
the experimental groups, the court imposed a fifty-year sentence on a nineteen-
year-old who reasonably but erroneously believed the girl with whom he had
consensual sex was eighteen. 104 In another, the court imposed an eight-year
sentence on an individual who imported seafood in plastic rather than card-
board containers, even though the individual did not know about the relevant
law. 105 In a third, a serial rapist received no jail time because he was the son of
a diplomat.106 Further exacerbating the atypical nature of the prompts, the ex-
perimental groups were exposed to seven of these cases at once.107
99. Id. at 2002-03 & tbl.6.
100. For the content of the Moral Credibility Scale, see id. at 1999 tbl.5.
101. Id at 2004-05. In a between-subjects design (to be distinguished from a "within-
subjects" design), the manipulation is hidden from the subjects; its effect is studied by using
two or more samples, ideally matched in all relevant respects, with each sample receiving a
different independent variable (here, a group that reads scenarios depicting "just" sentences
and a second group that reads scenarios depicting "unjust" sentences).
102. Id. at 2007 & tbl.7. It should also be noted, however, that while the authors found a
statistically significant difference in scores between the control and experimental situations,
that difference was not particularly large. The "baseline condition" (in response to "just"
scenarios) for the eight Moral Credibility Scale answers averaged 6.22 on a 9-point Likert
scale (with 9 indicating complete agreement with statements that grant maximum moral
credibility to the law). Id. The two groups exposed to the seven real-world injustice scenarios
averaged slightly above 5.2 and 5, respectively, which on the Scale's 9-point Likert spectrum
was midway between "strongly agree" and "strongly disagree." Id. at 2003, 2007.
103. See id. at 1999.
104. Id app. C at 2031.
105. Id.
106. Id. app. C at 2032.
107. See id. at 1999.
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In Study 3, which we conducted before we were aware of the Robinson,
Goodwin, and Reisig research, we employed a different methodology to test the
compliance thesis. Subsequently, because the results in Study 3 raised intri-
guing questions and because we had in the interim learned of the studies re-
ported in The Disutility of Injustice, we conducted a couple of follow-up stud-
ies, which we call Study 4. These latter studies utilized a between-subjects
methodology similar to that used in the second study reported in The Disutility
of Injustice, but relied on prompts that were less dramatic and that also injected
utilitarian considerations into the calculus. Finally, in Study 5 we examined
how long any noncompliance effects produced by these types of studies last.
1. Study 3: Does dissatisfaction with the law promote
noncompliance?
Methodology. This study proceeded in two stages, using the same 530 sub-
jects involved in Studies 1 and 2. os First, the participants received a list of
seventeen crimes, ranging from murder to various misdemeanors and, for each,
were asked what they thought the maximum sentence was in their jurisdiction
and what they thought the maximum sentence should be. One purpose of these
queries was to determine how well the participants knew the law in their juris-
diction, since an implicit assumption of empirical desert is that people are
aware of the extent to which the law differs from their own preferences.' 09 But
for present purposes the more important aspect of this study was to obtain in-
formation about the subjects' satisfaction with the law in their jurisdiction. For
some participants the answers to the "what is the law" question were identical
or very similar to their answers to the "what should the law be" question. For
others the divergence between these answers was quite marked with respect to
many or most of the crimes.
To quantify the results of this first part of the study, we constructed a "De-
gree of Dissatisfaction with the Law" Scale (Dissatisfaction Scale) that meas-
ured, for each participant, the difference between what participants believed the
law to be and what they thought it should be. The scale ranged from 0 (indicat-
ing no dissatisfaction with the law) to 11 (indicating a high degree of dissatis-
faction with the law). According to empirical desert theory, those with a high
score on the Dissatisfaction Scale should be more prone to noncompliance with
108. The subjects could not return to the prompts for Studies I and 2 after they accessed
the prompts for Study 3.
109. See Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1193-94 (hypothesizing that "[m]ost departures
from empirical desert will not be noticed by the public," in part because, as Robinson him-
self has noted in his criticism of general deterrence theory, "'what we know from studies is
that even criminals commonly have no idea what the [criminal law's] rule is"' (emphasis in
first quotation omitted) (alteration of second quotation in original) (quoting Robinson, Doing
Justice as Controlling Crime, supra note 28, at 1093)). Without reporting results relevant to
this matter in detail, we can indicate that our results show that very few people have accurate
information about sentencing laws in their jurisdictions.
January 2013] 101
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
the law than those with a low score. While, given the mundane nature of the
crimes involved in this study, even those who indicate a high degree of dissatis-
faction on this scale may not have had as much antipathy toward criminal jus-
tice as those exposed to Nadler's and Robinson's more dramatic scenarios, the
reaction measured by the scale probably better represents commonly held be-
liefs about how criminal justice works on an everyday basis. Thus, the latter
beliefs may well be more likely determinants of the extent, if any, to which di-
vergence between the criminal law and the public's views typically affects the
public's compliance and cooperation with the criminal law.
The second stage of the study involved ascertaining our participants' rela-
tive willingness to comply with the law. Although we suspect that any survey
measure of perceptions about the likelihood one will violate the law has mini-
mal external validity, we decided that Nadler's Likelihood of Criminal Behav-
ior Questionnaire would be an appropriate evaluation instrument because she
had used it with some success in her own research.1 10 We expected, contrary to
the compliance hypothesis, that compliance rates measured by Nadler's scale
would be similar regardless of whether the participant expressed great dissatis-
faction with perceived punishments in his or her jurisdiction or none at all.
Results. Our expectations were not entirely borne out by the results of this
study. Rather, as indicated in Table 3, we found a small but noticeable correla-
tion between dissatisfaction with the law and noncompliance, a correlation that
varied in an interesting way. In the group that in Studies 1 and 2 read Robinson
and Kurzban's unchanged scenarios, there was a marginally significant correla-
tion of 0.1 between dissatisfaction with the law and noncompliance."' In the
group that in Studies 1 and 2 received the manipulated scenarios, the correla-
tion was a statistically significant 0.22.112
Two points are worth emphasizing about these results. First, the correlation
between dissatisfaction with the law and noncompliance was weak. Even a 0.2
correlation is, at best, suggestive of a relationship.11 3 The second point is that,
110. See Nadler, supra note 45, at 1413-14. Nadler's questionnaire included eight
crimes: drunk driving, parking in a no-parking zone, failing to pay required taxes, making
illegal copies of software, eating a small item without paying in the grocery store, exceeding
the posted speed limit, drinking alcohol under age twenty-one, and taking home office sup-
plies for personal use. Id. Simply out of curiosity, we added burglary and unjustified homi-
cide to the list. With respect to both of these crimes, willingness to comply was at or near
100% regardless of the conditions to which the subjects were exposed.
11l. P-value 5 0.118. The correlation test used was a Pearson's R, which like most cor-
relation measures produces a range of 0.00 (indicating no relationship between the measured
variables) to 1.0 or -1.0 (indicating a very strong positive or negative relationship, respec-
tively). See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 71, app. B at 245 (defining correlation coefficients).
112. P-value50.001.
113. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 223-24. Also worth noting is that the relia-
bility of the correlation coefficient increases with its absolute value, so that a difference of
0.1 between two correlations is much less significant if the two coefficients are 0.15 and 0.25
than if they are 0.8 and 0.9. See What Are Basic Statistics?: How to Determine Whether Two
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to the extent we did find a correlation between dissatisfaction with the law and
noncompliance, it was much stronger with the group exposed to the manipulat-
ed scenarios. We were confused by this finding initially, since in this part of the
study everyone was given identical prompts: both groups were asked to indi-
cate the sentence for the seventeen listed crimes as well as what the sentence
should be. But of course there was one difference between the two groups. The
most noncompliant group had read, in connection with Studies 1 and 2, several
scenarios providing them with information relevant to utilitarian goals such as
treatability and risk. Perhaps these scenarios brought home the fact that the cur-
rent sentencing regime (at least as perceived by the subjects) does not provide
enough flexibility to take into account these types of factors, which in turn in-
creased both dissatisfaction and noncompliance.
FIGURE 1
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Mean Non-Compliance Score
In short, Study 3 provides only minimal support for the compliance hy-
pothesis. Furthermore, Study 3 suggests that, while failing to adhere to desert
might cause some noncompliance, failing to adhere to utilitarian goals could
cause even more noncompliance. Study 4, in its two variants, was designed to
investigate the latter possibility further.
Correlation Coefficients Are Significant, STATSoFT, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/basic-
statistics/#Correlationsc (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
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2. Studies 4A & B: What type ofdissatisfaction promotes the most
noncompliance?
Methodology. The results of Study 3 at best mildly imply that punishment
that departs from utilitarian concerns is somewhat more likely to cause non-
compliance with the law than punishment that diverges from desert. In Study
4A we explored this possibility further by fiving a new online sample of 236
people six scenarios from Studies 1 and 2,1 4 specifically the six scenarios that
were manipulated in those studies to include utilitarian considerations. Howev-
er, instead of asking the subjects to rank or assign punishment as we did in the
earlier studies, we provided them with the sentence that John received, one we
made up but which we told the subjects was "based" on the results of "an actual
case."
The sample was broken into three groups. To the first third of the sample
(the control group) we gave the scenarios without the manipulation and told the
subjects that John received a sentence identical to the average sentence as-
signed by the control group in Study 2 (the 264 subjects in that study who were
given the unmani ulated scenarios). Given the standard deviations reported in
the latter study," this average sentence was only chosen by a small percentage
of the subjects in that study, but it nonetheless represented a reasonably "just"
sentence based on our data. To another third of the sample (the experimental-
utilitarian group) we gave the subjects the scenarios with the utilitarian manipu-
lation and told them that John received either a much harsher or much more le-
nient sentence than the sentence given the control group, in the direction oppo-
site to what one would predict given the nature of the utilitarian-oriented
information. For instance, in the T-shirt theft scenario where John expressed
remorse and paid restitution, participants were told that John received a particu-
larly harsh sentence (ten years as opposed to the average of two months as-
signed by the participants in Study 2), and in the scenario where he vowed to
steal again participants were told he received a particularly lenient sentence
(one year as opposed to the average of three years he received from the partici-
pants in Study 2). To the final third of the sample (the experimental-desert
group) we gave the same scenarios that we gave the control group (that is,
without the utilitarian information) but told the subjects that John received the
same "unfair" sentence that we provided the experimental-utilitarian group (see
Appendix B for further description).
114. For Studies 4A, 4B, 7A, and 7B, declining funding compelled us to use the online
survey service Amazon Mechanical Turk instead of the Owen School eLab, see supra note
62. The Amazon service enables researchers to programmatically access an on-demand, di-
verse workforce that is paid per task. Amazon's service is less expensive and may be some-
what more likely to solicit inattentive participants, but on the whole has proven trustworthy.
See Jennifer Jacquet, The Pros & Cons of Amazon Mechanical Turk for Scientific Surveys,
Sci. AM. (July 7, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guilty-planet/2011/07/07/the-
pros-cons-of-amazon-mechanical-turk-for-scientific-surveys.
115. See supra Table 2.
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We then asked each of the three groups to answer questions relevant to
compliance. In this Study we not only gave the subjects Nadler's Likelihood of
Criminal Behavior Questionnaire (where a higher score means less compliance)
but also the Moral Credibility Scale that Robinson and his coauthors used in
The Disutility ofInjustice (where a higher score means more compliance).1 6 In
this way, we hoped to get a sense not only of the subjects' willingness to com-
ply with the law but also the subjects' willingness to endorse the legitimacy of
the system and cooperate with authorities.
Given the results in Study 3, our hypothesis was that, because of their dis-
satisfaction with the sentences John received, the experimental groups would
be more likely to indicate less compliance and cooperation than the control
group, but only by a small margin. We further hypothesized that the experi-
mental-utilitarian/desert group would have somewhat higher noncompli-
ance/noncooperation scores than the experimental-desert group because in the
former condition the subjects were confronted by sentences that were both
strongly disproportionate to desert and strongly inconsistent with a prevention
rationale.
Results and Further Research. As depicted in the two columns labeled
Study 4A in Table 3, these hypotheses were not supported by our data. In fact,
consistent with our original hypothesis in connection with Study 3, we found
no statistically significant difference between any of the three groups on either
the Likelihood of Criminal Behavior Scale (designated the "Composite Com-
pliance Score") or the Moral Credibility Scale (designated the "Composite Co-
operation Score").
On the theory that the reason we obtained this result was that our changes
in sentence for the two experimental groups were not sufficiently aberrant to
occasion any response, we ran the same study with a new sample of 289
people, except that we increased or decreased the sentences significantly in the
experimental-utilitarian and experimental-desert conditions (for instance, John
received a twenty-year sentence for the T-shirt theft)."' Additionally, in this
study, which we call Study 4B, we altered our methodology to conform more
closely to the methodology followed in The Disutility ofInjustice by asking the
subjects to decide on a sentence for John before we provided his "actual"
116. See Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 1999. The Moral Credibility Scale uses a 9-
point Likert scale (which we modified to 5 points) to gauge the extent to which subjects
would: (1) believe that a person the criminal justice system sentences to life must deserve the
punishment he received; (2) consider whether a law prohibiting posting false comments
online criminalizes a condemnable act; (3) conclude that a sentence of twenty-eight to thirty-
two years for a financial maneuver on taxes is morally condemnable; (4) report a person who
has illegally taken an arrowhead from an important historical site; (5) take a handgun found
in an alley to the police; (6) report a neighbor who has six dogs, three more than is legally
allowed; (7) return to pay for a tank of gas they inadvertently did not pay for even though
they are unlikely to get caught; and (8) return to pay a restaurant bill they inadvertently did
not pay even though it is unlikely they would get caught.
117. See infra Appendix B for details on the manipulations.
January 2013] 105
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
sentence, in the hope that the harshness or leniency of the sentences we then
described to the experimental groups would be more clearly brought home to
them. Our hypothesis remained the same as in Study 4A, to wit, that the two
experimental groups would exhibit less compliance and cooperation than the
control group, and that the experimental-utilitarian group would exhibit less
compliance and less cooperation than the group that received sentences dispro-
portionate solely to desert.
TABLE 3
Relationship Between "Just" and "Unjust" Sentences
and Noncompliance/Noncooperation
(no differences in values are significant atp 0.05)
Composite Compliance Composite Cooperation
Score (on 100-pt. scale) Score (on 5-pt. scale)
Scenario Groupines Study 4A Study 4B Study 4A Study 4B
Control: No utilitarian factors 20.83 21.19 2.62 3.21
and "just" sentences
Exp. Utilitarian: Utilitarian 20.21 17.63* 2.59 3.38
factors and "unjust"
sentences
Exp. Desert: No utilitarian 21.4 19.5 2.39 3.27
factors and "unjust"
sentences
* Significant at p < 0.15
Again, our results, reported in Table 3 as Study 4B, surprised us.1 Con-
trary to Robinson et al.'s findings, none of the groups differed significantly on
the Moral Credibility Scale, suggesting either that this scale is not sensitive
enough in these types of surveys, or that there is simply no clear relationship
between dissatisfaction with legal results and willingness to cooperate with the
law or endorse its results. In looking at the average scores under the Likelihood
of Criminal Behavior Scale we did find one instance of a relationship that ap-
proached significance, but not in the direction we expected. As the Composite
Compliance Score for Study 4B indicates, the experimental-utilitarian group-
118. Particularly so since Study 4B was conducted two days after the jury returned a
verdict of acquittal on the most serious charges in the Casey Anthony case, a decision that
occasioned major outcry about the criminal justice system. See Amy Pavuk & Bianca Prieto,
Casey Anthony Not Guilty of Murder, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 5, 2011),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-05/news/os-casey-anthony-verdict-20110704.
Under empirical desert theory, this event should have created a greater tendency toward non-
compliance in our sample.
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the group that received the most off-kilter sentences-was the least likely to
register noncompliance effects (see cell marked with an asterisk). This result is
contrary both to our hypothesis and to Robinson and Kurzban's.
Because this difference, with a p-value 5 0.15, did not meet the standard
test for statistical significance and is in any event small, it could be spurious. 119
However, when we dug more deeply into the data we found a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between compliance and the extent to which the sentences
the subjects in this experimental group wanted to impose on John departed
from the sentence John actually received.120 In other words, the more bothered
these subjects were over the sentence John received, the less likely they were to
register a willingness to engage in criminal behavior.121
One possible explanation for this result could come from general deter-
rence theory. Perhaps people are less willing to commit the types of minor
crimes listed in the Likelihood of Criminal Behavior Scale when confronted
with wildly irrational sentencing practices. After all, if the government can im-
pose a twenty-year sentence for stealing a T-shirt after the offender apologizes
and pays for it (as occurred in one of the experimental-utilitarian scenarios in
Study 4B), imagine what it could do in a speeding or illegal downloading case.
Of equally significant interest is the fact that we did not obtain even a mar-
ginally significant difference between the control group and the experimental-
desert group, in terms either of compliance or cooperation and endorsement.
This result is contrary to the results obtained by both Nadler and Robinson et
al. Perhaps the prompts given to the experimental groups in Nadler's and Rob-
inson et al.'s research were viewed as more unjust than even the enhanced
changes in dispositions we used in Study 4B, and thus had a greater impact.122
Or perhaps any anticompliance effect in the experimental groups was counter-
acted by fears of irrational punishment, while any procompliance effect in the
control group-the group provided "rational" scenarios-was counteracted by
119. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 212 (stating that the "most common"
threshold for significance is 0.05, roughly meaning a 95% probability that the difference is
not due to chance). However, higherp-values do not necessarily mean differences are nonex-
istent. See D.H. Kaye, Is Proof ofStatistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333,
1354 (1986).
120. The correlation was 0.28,p < 0.023. In no other group was this correlation signifi-
cant.
121. At first glance, comparison of the composite cooperation scores in Studies 4A and
4B may seem to confirm this tendency because the participants in Study 4B, who received
more "unjust" scenarios than the participants in Study 4A, had appreciably higher coopera-
tion scores. However, since these two studies involved different samples, direct comparisons
cannot be made. See supra note 50.
122. Nadler's excessive lenience scenario involved an individual who witnessed his
friend molesting a young girl and did not report it, yet was not prosecuted or even arrested.
Nadler, supra note 45, at 1417. Her excessive harshness scenarios were described in three
newspaper stories reporting legislation that unfairly imposed taxes, permitted government
confiscation of property, and infringed civil liberties. Id. at 1413. For a description of Robin-
son et al.'s scenarios, see supra text accompanying notes 97, 103-107.
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the "moral credentialing" phenomenon described earlier, which Nadler hypoth-
esizes might lead people to "feel licensed to act on questionable motives when
they have previously established their credentials as a person of pure mo-
tives." 123
Be that as it may, our main focus in this study was not to replicate the
Nadler or Robinson et al. studies but to compare the effect on noncompliance
of divergence with desert to the noncompliance effects of divergence from
utilitarian considerations. The results summarized in Table 3 suggest that com-
pliance and cooperation/endorsement effects are very similar regardless of
whether the divergence is from desert or utilitarian goals. Taken together, Stud-
ies 3, 4A, and 4B do not support any particular position with respect to the
compliance hypothesis; rather, they suggest that the relationship between com-
pliance and satisfaction with the substance of the criminal law is complicated
and difficult to predict, and that any relationship that does exist is not likely to
be very strong.
3. Study 5: How long does dissatisfaction with the law last?
Methodology. Our next study raises a more fundamental concern about the
compliance hypothesis to the extent that it suggests that noncompliance atti-
tudes resulting from the failure of the criminal law to follow community views
is more than fleeting. This study featured three samples from law school classes
at Vanderbilt University Law School and the materials that Nadler used in her
Flouting the Law studies. 124 Seventy-four students read her stories depicting
legislation that unjustly deprived individuals of property, income, or privacy
(the harsh treatment condition). A second group of seventy-two students read
her story describing an individual who was not prosecuted for an act most
would consider blameworthy (the lenient treatment condition). Finally, a third
group of forty-seven students (the control group) did not read either type of
story.
These three groups were then given Nadler's Likelihood of Criminal Be-
havior Questionnaire. However, rather than administer that questionnaire to
everyone immediately after reading the stories, as Nadler did, we delayed giv-
ing the questionnaire to approximately half of all three groups (thirty-five who
read the harsh-treatment stories, thirty-five who read the lenient-treatment sto-
ry, and twenty-two who did not read the stories). The delay ranged from seven
to ten days after the first two groups read the stories. Our hypothesis was that
any umbrage about unfair government practices dissipates quickly.
123. Nadler, supra note 45, at 1421.
124. This sampling method was necessary because of the two-stage nature of this
Study, something that cannot be easily carried out using online survey programs in which
participants are anonymous.
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TABLE 4
Relationship of Attitudes to Delayed Measurement of Compliance
(cells marked "a" are statistically different from cells marked "b,"p < 0.05)
Group Composite Noncompliance Score
Simultaneous Compliance Delayed Compliance
Questionnaire Questionnaire
Did not read stories 35.15 (N=25)' 35.5 (N=22)a
Read stories depicting 38.8 (N=39)b 36.6 (N=35)'
harsh treatment
Read story depicting 37.9 (N=37)b 35.16 (N=35)"
lenient treatment
Results. As indicated in Table 4, this hypothesis was sustained. Compared
to the control group that did not read any stories, and consistent with Nadler's
findings, the two groups that received the Likelihood of Criminal Behavior
Scale immediately after reading the stories registered slight upticks (both statis-
tically significant) in noncompliance scores. 5 But we found virtually identical
noncompliance rates between the control group and the two halves of the ex-
perimental groups that completed the scale seven to ten days after reading the
stories. These findings suggest that dissatisfaction with unjust legal rules and
dispositions either does not last very long or does not have a long-lasting effect
on willingness to flout the law.
Of course, Robinson's compliance hypothesis, stated fairly, is that reduced
compliance with the law is a result of repeated or constant divergence between
the criminal law and societal views, rather than the product of one-time expo-
125. Note that composite compliance scores reported in Table 4 are higher (by about
fifteen points) than the composite compliance scores reported in Table 3, even though the
same measure (Nadler's Likelihood of Criminal Behavior Scale) was used in both studies.
There are at least three explanations for this difference. First, of course, the prompts in Stud-
ies 4A and 4B were different from those used in Study 5. See supra text accompanying notes
122-124. Second, the subjects in the first two studies, obtained through an online survey ser-
vice, were approximately eight years older, on average, than the law students used in Study
5. See infra Appendix D. Social scientists have long known that age and risk averseness are
related. See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK:
A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 19-35 (2011) (detailing developmental and neurological
research indicating that juveniles are much more impulsive and risk-seeking than adults). A
third difference may have to do with assumptions about anonymity. Although the online
samples were guaranteed anonymity, some of the participants in Studies 4A and 4B may still
have been reluctant to report willingness to commit crimes. The students in Study 5, in




sure to one or more stories of injustice. 126 Further research will need to explore
this possibility. As one of us has noted elsewhere, however, the fact that the
criminal law provisions in many states consistently depart from widely held
views about desert does not appear to be associated with greater noncompliance
in those jurisdictions, "either because members of the public are not aware of
the divergence... , do not care about it .. ., or ... are more prone to obey than
disobey the law even when they are disgruntled by it."1 27
C. Hypothesis III: Crime Control
Robinson not only argues that following desert can lead to more compli-
ance and cooperation, but also that these positive effects could be stronger than
those produced by a regime that focuses more directly on increasing compli-
ance with the law through incapacitation, rehabilitation, and general deterrence.
As noted earlier, he has stated that "strong arguments suggest greater utility in a
distribution based on shared intuitions of justice than in a distribution based
upon optimizing deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation." 28 However, to
date no research supports this view, and the research reported in Studies 3, 4A,
and 4B suggests that a mixture of utilitarian and desert goals may be no worse
and perhaps even better at promoting compliance and cooperation, at least as
measured by Robinson's Moral Credibility Scale and Nadler's Likelihood of
Criminal Behavior Scale.
More importantly, neither the research conducted by Robinson and Nadler
nor the research reported up to this point in this Article gets at the core question
raised by empirical desert theory: will a regime based on desert be better at
crime control than a regime more directly attuned to prevention? Assuming
correctional programs have any efficacy at reducing crime, the answer to this
question is unlikely to be yes.
As an illustration of this point, consider the robust research concluding that
Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), a community-based treatment consisting of
four to six months of intense intervention and subsequent monitoring, is signif-
icantly more effective at reducing repeat violence among juveniles than prison
or other programs of longer duration. 129 If the sole goal of the criminal justice
system were desert, juveniles who commit violent crime would presumably
receive some incarceration, or at least some type of supervision, of far more
than a half-year duration; indeed, researchers have found that people believe
126. See Robinson, Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, supra note 28, at 1106 ("[A]
criminal justice system that regularly does injustice and/or fails to do justice is one that risks
prompting resistance and subversion ..... (emphasis added)).
127. Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1198-99.
128. Robinson, The Role ofMoral Philosophers, supra note 28, at 1836.
129. See Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1201-02 (citing ScorT W. HENGGELER ET AL.,
MULTIsYsTEMic TREATMENT OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 252-
54 (1998)).
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adolescents who commit violent acts deserve a serious penalty.130 But the
research on MST noted above indicates that the latter disposition is unlikely to
be as good as MST at reducing crime among the affected juveniles. Nor is a
prolonged prison term likely to be better at minimizing crime by others, unless
normally law-abiding people become so upset by the community-based treat-
ment that they take the law into their own hands, or unless the fact that no pris-
on is involved seriously undercuts general deterrence. The first development is
improbable.131 The second development is a greater possibility but still unlike-
ly, for reasons Robinson himself has helped delineate.132
Conversely, punishment based on empirical desert may often result in dis-
positions that ignore the potential for recidivism reduction and even aggravate
it. Consider some of the data reported in The Disutility of Injustice. Robinson
and his coauthors found that, while the punishments imposed by their subjects
were on the whole much lower than the punishments imposed in the actual cas-
es that were used as prompts, they were still "quite punitive."l 33 For example,
subjects given scenarios involving theft of a microwave, an assault requiring
two stitches, and a similar assault during an attempted theft (scenarios also used
both by Robinson and Kurzban and by us in our first two studies)134 assigned,
on average, sentences of 2.3 years, 5 years, and 9.1 years, respectively.135 The-
se subjects also assigned a 17.7-year sentence to an accomplice to a felony
murder, a 19.2-year sentence to a juvenile who accidentally shot a school
teacher, and a 26.3-year sentence to a mentally ill mother who drowned her
children, believing their deaths would save them from going to hell. 136 Even
setting aside the probable criminogenic impact of incarceration, 137 confining
130. See, e.g., ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 21, at 141 (reporting a study indicating
that the average penalty assigned by lay participants to fourteen-year-olds who commit mur-
der was over six years); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Public Attitudes About the Culpability and
Punishment of Young Offenders, 24 BEHAV. Set. & L. 815, 823 (2006) (finding that partici-
pants assigned the same level of culpability to an offender whether they believed the offend-
er was a fifteen-year-old or a twenty-year-old).
131. Research indicates that the public is not averse to community-based dispositions
for juveniles when allowed to consider "effectiveness" rather than desert. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH S. Scorr & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 281 (2008)
("Adult punishment and long incarceration are approved, for the most part, only as a means
to protect the public from violent young criminals; . . . if other more lenient sanctions are
effective, they are favored over incarceration.").
132. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behav-
ioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174, 204-05 (2004) (catalogu-
ing reasons why differences in criminal dispositions have little general deterrent effect).
133. Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 1974.
134. See infra Appendix A for a description of the scenarios.
135. Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 1972 tbl.4.
136. Id.
137. See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 1049,
1108.
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such people for these extensive periods of time is unlikely to be as effective at
reducing crime as more traditional utilitarian attempts at doing so.138
What examples like this suggest is that, from a strictly utilitarian perspec-
tive, empirical desert theory may have it backward. Rather than using desert as
the linchpin of punishment and hoping that crime prevention will thereby oc-
cur, it would make more sense to prefer dispositions like MST that aim directly
at preventing crime, unless they are so antithetical to desert that vigilantism or
other negative effects will result. The final studies we conducted indirectly test-
ed this proposition. More specifically, they sought to test the extent to which
departing from desert is acceptable to laypeople when they are given utilitarian
reasons for doing so.
1. Study 6: To what extent are assessments of desert affected by
preventive considerations?
Methodology. In this study we gave the same 530 subjects involved in
Studies 1 and 2 four scenarios depicting different offenders, all with criminal
records. 139 As described in more detail in Appendix C, the four scenarios in-
volved: an adult who has committed three separate crimes (grand theft auto,
burglary, and theft of golf clubs), an adult who has just been convicted of his
third drunk driving offense, a juvenile who committed three progressively more
serious assaults, and an adult drug addict who committed three thefts, the last
of which involved a minor assault. The control group of 264 subjects was given
a description of the personal and offense history of each of these offenders,
while the experimental group of 266 subjects was given, in addition, a descrip-
tion of innovative treatment programs like MST that were said to be effective at
reducing recidivism. Specifically, the experimental group was told that, once
sentenced, the adult theft recidivist would be required to participate in a one-
year rehabilitative program shown to reduce offending by thieves, 140 the drunk
driver would be subject to a six-month substance abuse treatment program that
138. Robinson has argued that, for at least some crimes, alternatives to prison can have
as much "punitive 'bite' as prison. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role ofDeter-
rence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO.
L.J. 949, 996 (2003). But the duration of these alternatives would have to be extreme in or-
der to equate with the prison terms described in the text. Cf Robert E. Harlow, John M. Dar-
ley & Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical
Scaling Approach to Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
71, 86 (1995) (finding, for example, that survey participants view a six-month prison term as
equivalent to eighteen months of intermediate sanctions, and that "[n]o intermediate sanc-
tions were seen as equivalent to prison terms of 2 years or more").
139. The subjects were unable to return to the prompts for Studies 1, 2, or 3 after they
accessed the prompts for this study.
140. Some research indicates that putting theft offenders on probation upon condition of
undergoing some type of treatment reduces recidivism rates. See, e.g., Ted Bartell & L.
Thomas Winfree, Jr., Recidivist Impacts of Diferential Sentencing Practices for Burglary
Offenders, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 387, 394 (1977).
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eliminates alcohol cravings, 141 the juvenile recidivist would be involved in a
six-month MST program, 42 and the drug addict would undergo a one-year
"dru court" program involving treatment and close supervision in the commu-
nity. 43
We asked participants in both groups to carry out two tasks. First, they
were to assign punishments on the same thirty-point scale that we used in Study
2. Second, they were to indicate how much of the punishment they assigned
could occur in the community. Our hypothesis was that, compared to the con-
trol group, the experimental group would be willing to reduce both the length
of punishment and the amount of dispositional time spent in prison.
Results. Consistent with this hypothesis, the subjects given the treatment
information were more likely to prescribe lower sentences in each of the four
scenarios, as well as somewhat more likely to permit community dispositions in
each. As displayed in Table 5, the sentence lengths imposed by the experi-
mental group were 26% lower (for the juvenile) to 43% lower (for the drunk
driver) than those that were imposed by the control group, and the portion of
that sentence to be served in prison was from 20% to 43% shorter than for the
control group. Combining these two variables, Table 5 also indicates the aver-
age prison time imposed by the two groups for each scenario. The incarceration
difference ranged from 32% less prison time for the juvenile recidivist to 51%
less time for the drunken driving recidivist. Furthermore, the experimental and
control groups ranked the four offenders differently in terms of punishment
length. The control group imposed the most punishment on the adult theft re-
cidivist, followed by the drug addict, the juvenile offender, and the drunk driv-
er. The experimental group also imposed the most punishment on the adult
141. Some substance abuse treatment programs appear to reduce recidivism rates. See
William D. Bales et al., Substance Abuse Treatment in Prison and Community Reentry:
Breaking the Cycle ofDrugs, Crime, Incarceration, and Recidivism?, 3 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 383, 389 (2006) (stating, with several qualifications and notable exceptions, that
"studies indicate that offenders who participate in prison-based substance abuse treatment
programs experience more successful community reentry, as compared to offenders who do
not participate in the programs while incarcerated").
142. For a description of MST, see Blueprints for Violence Prevention Model Pro-
grams: Multisystemic Therapy (MST), CTR. FOR STUDY & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,
http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/modelprograms/MST.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2012) (stating that MST reduces long-term recidivism rates by 25% to 70% and reduces out-
of-home placements by 47% to 64%, with the result that MST has been found to be "the
most cost-effective of a wide range of intervention programs aimed at serious juvenile of-
fenders").
143. For a description of drug court treatment programs, see Peggy Fulton Hora et al.,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 439, 502 (1999) ("[Drug courts] across the country have recorded substantial success
in retaining participants in treatment programs, reducing recidivism rates, and saving crimi-
nal justice system resources.").
113January 2013]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
theft recidivist and the least on the drunk driver, but reversed the ranking of the
juvenile and the addict.
TABLE 5
Sentences Assigned to Recidivists With and Without Treatment Information
(differences in total confinement within each scenario significant, p : 0.05)
Control Group Experimental Group
Recidivists Overall % in Total Overall % in Total
Sentence Cmty. Confinement Sentence Cmty. Prison
Recidivist 8.7 17.8 7.2 5.1 22.3 3.9
Thief &
Burglar
Recidivist 6.3 22.3 4.9 3.6 31.8 2.4
Drunk
Driver
Recidivist 6.5 16.6 5.4 4.8 23.4 3.7
Violent
Juvenile
Recidivist 6.7 15.3 5.7 4.4 26.8 3.2
Addict
Thief
The total-confinement differences, all of them statistically significant, sug-
gest that information about a plausible treatment program both lowers and
changes what people think offenders "deserve," and makes them more willing
to contemplate a disposition other than confinement. In other words, consistent
with the results of Study 1, people's views of desert are affected by preventive
considerations. Fashioning a criminal justice system solely around desert would
not be in accord with the fully informed views of the public.
The results of this Study also suggest, however, that laypeople are unwill-
ing to abandon desert as a criterion for punishment. In each of the four cases
even the experimental group, which was told that treatment interventions rang-
ing from six months to a year could reduce the offender's risk, wanted to im-
pose prison time beyond what was needed for the treatment. How strong is this
desire to impose desert-based punishment? Our last study-carried out in three
variations-begins to answer this question.
2. Studies 7A, B & C: To what extent do laypeople prefer
dispositions focused on prevention rather than desert?
Methodology. In this study we used the four scenarios from Study 6, plus
an additional two scenarios taken from one of Robinson's studies, the first in-
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volving a city official who accepts a bribe and the second involving an employ-
ee who murders his boss after being fired (see Appendix C for a full description
of the scenarios).144 We gave these six scenarios to the same sample that we
used in Study 4A, divided into two groups.145 The first group (the desert group)
received the scenario descriptions without treatment information. The second
group (the treatment group) received the scenario descriptions with treatment
information. For the four scenarios that were used in Study 6, this treatment in-
formation was identical to the information conveyed in that Study. In the first
scenario borrowed from Robinson we stated that the city manager offered to
return the bribe and give another $20,000 to the city, plus work in community
outreach programs for the next six years. In the second borrowed Robinson
scenario (involving murder) we stated that by the end of the employee's third
year in prison he had experienced a religious conversion, renounced violence,
and provided restitution to the family.
To get a different sense of how desert and prevention goals interact, we
changed the focus of inquiry in this Study. Instead of asking the subjects to im-
pose punishment on the thirty-point punishment scale that we used in Study 6,
we gave the desert and treatment groups only two punishment options. As indi-
cated in Appendix C, the first option was a "determinate sentence" involving a
very narrow sentence range (two years), centered around the average punish-
ment assigned by the control subjects in Study 6 for the first four scenarios and
around the average punishment imposed by Robinson's subjects for the two
scenarios we took from his research. 146 The second option was an "indetermi-
nate sentence" involving a different range for each scenario, with the lowest
range (for the juvenile offender) starting at six months of probation and ending
at five years in prison and the highest range (for the murderer) starting at three
years in prison and ending at fifty years. These ranges were selected somewhat
arbitrarily, but were meant to reflect a flexible sentencing regime.
The goal of this Study was to determine the extent to which our subjects
were willing to contemplate, under these various conditions, an indeterminate
sentence that was not closely tied to desert. We hypothesized that the desert
group would be likely to pick the determinate, desert-oriented option, since it
did not receive treatment information and thus would prefer a punishment
bounded by desert. We hypothesized that the treatment group would be more
likely to pick the indeterminate option because the treatment information would
push it toward choosing a more flexible punishment scheme that allowed utili-
tarian goals to operate.
Results and Further Research. Our results, reported in Table 6 as Study
7A, largely supported these two hypotheses. As hypothesized, the treatment
144. For the source of these scenarios, see Robinson et al., supra note 64, at 774-75.
145. The subjects could not return to the prompts for Study 4A after they accessed the
prompts for this Study.
146. See Robinson et al., supra note 64, at 781 & tbl.4.
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group was more likely to pick the indeterminate option and the desert group
was more likely to pick the determinate option. Across the six cases, 61% of
the treatment group picked the indeterminate option, while 52% of the desert
group did so. Although this difference was not statistically significant in con-
ventional terms, that was due to the fact that even the desert group picked the
indeterminate option a substantial percentage of the time, with a majority of
that group choosing the indeterminate option in three of the six cases and 49%
of that group picking that option in two of the remaining three cases. In the
sixth case, involving murder, a majority of both the desert and the treatment
groups picked the determinate option, again demonstrating that people are less
likely to veer from desert-based punishment in connection with serious cnmes.
TABLE 6
Determinate Versus Indeterminate Sentencing
(indicating percentage preferring indeterminate sentences)
Study 7A Study 7B (Broader Ranges)
Desert Treatment Desert Group Treatment
Group Group Group
Recidivist Thief & Burglar 52 60 40 64
Recidivist Drunk Driver 54 52 32** 52**
Recidivist Violent Juvenile 62 64 61 57
Recidivist Addict Thief 49* 72* 45* 57*
Corrupt City Manager 49* 68* 44* 63*
Murderer 44 48 7* 20*
Average 52** 61** 38** 52**
* p : 0.01; ** p : 0.2
Although overall both groups chose the indeterminate option at least as of-
ten as the determinate one, we were concerned that the popularity of the inde-
terminate choice could merely mean that many people in the desert group pre-
ferred a desert-based sentence outside the determinate range we gave them and
decided that the indeterminate option (which in this Study had a very low min-
imum but a maximum no greater than the determinate option) was the next best
alternative. Put another way, disagreement with the determinate option in this
Study could be explained by our finding in Study 2 that conclusions about pun-
ishment are widely dispersed over the punishment spectrum rather than a result
of a real preference for the type of "indeterminate" option we gave our subjects.
In an effort to test this possibility we gave the scenarios to another sample (the
same sample we used for Study 4B) 1 but with determinate ranges that were
147. The subjects could not return to the prompts for Study 4B after they accessed the
prompts for this Study.
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somewhat broader (three years instead of two) and indeterminate ranges that
were broader as well, on the theory that subjects in the desert condition were
more likely to pick "determinate" sentences if the range was broader and the
indeterminate range was not bounded by desert considerations.
This hypothesis was partially borne out, as the results reported as Study 7B
in Table 6 indicate. While the treatment group was still likely to pick the inde-
terminate option in all cases except the one involving the homicide, the desert
group in this Study was more likely than the desert group in Study 7A to pick
the determinate option in every scenario. Even under the modified conditions,
however, if we exclude the homicide case (where only 7% of the desert group
and 20% of the treatment group chose the indeterminate option), anywhere
from 32% to 61% of the desert group rejected the expanded determinate option
and chose the indeterminate one, and 52% to 64% of the treatment group
picked the indeterminate option.
Curious about how influential treatment information of the type we de-
scribed in these scenarios might be, we conducted a third variant of Study 7,
using the same six scenarios but this time employing a two-step process. A new
68-person sample-23 professional staff at Vanderbilt University Law School
and 45 participants solicited "off the street"148 -was first given the scenarios
without the treatment information and asked to assign a punishment on a modi-
fied 15-point scale. The participants were next given the treatment information,
but this time adding a statement that the treatment was either successful or not
successful, and that correctional authorities thus believed either that the offend-
er was unlikely to repeat his offenses or that he was likely to reoffend. The sub-
jects were then asked again to assign a punishment (see Appendix C for a fuller
description). We anticipated that, for the majority of the participants, the se-
cond-stage punishments would be appreciably lower or higher, depending upon
the assertions by correctional authorities.
The results from this final version of Study 7, reported below in Table 7,
confirmed this hypothesis, again except with respect to the case involving the
homicide. The second column in Table 7 indicates for each of the six scenarios
the sentence the subjects imposed at the first stage when no treatment infor-
mation was provided. The data reported in the third, fourth, and fifth columns
indicate that, in five of the six cases, a majority of the participants were willing
to abandon the desert-based sentence they imposed during the first stage after
they were provided with treatability and risk information. Even in the sixth
case, involving the homicide, treatment information changed the views of 39%
of the participants, who reduced the sentence by an average of 42%.
148. As indicated in Appendix D, this sample did not include any African Americans. If
this lack of diversity biases the results in any direction, it is probably toward less leniency.
Cf PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND
PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 205 (1997) (concluding that African American ethnicity is corre-
lated with somewhat more lenient sentence choices, although educational attainment is the




Changes in Sentence Resulting from Risk/Treatability Information
Average Disposition After Risk Information
Desert- % No % Change % Inde-
Based Change (% Inc./ Dec.) terminate
Sentence Extension
Recidivist Juvenile 7.6 15 85 (-71) N/A
(Treatment successful)
Manager 5.3 19 81 (-44) N/A
(Provides restitution and reforms)
Recidivist Addict Thief 3.9 27 73 (-92) N/A
(Treatment successful)
Recidivist Thief 5.2 31 27 (+55) 42
(Treatment unsuccessful)
Recidivist Drunk Driver 6.1 48 2 (+16) 50
(Treatment unsuccessful)
Murderer (Finds religion and Life 61* 39 (-42) N/A
provides restitution)
* Assigning life a value of sixty years
As the increasing percentages in the third column ("% No Change") shows,
willingness to move away from a desert-based punishment decreased when
treatment was not successful or when the crime was serious. The fourth column
indicates the average amount that participants who were willing to abandon a
desert-based disposition increased or decreased the sentence in light of the
treatability/risk information. The final column shows that, in the two scenarios
where treatment was not successful and correctional authorities considered the
individual a high risk, many subjects opted for an indeterminate sentence based
on decisions by experts; these choices are not reflected in the average increase
to sentence noted in the fourth column because they could not be quantified.
These findings corroborate the finding in Study 6 that plausible treatment
information can change views about punishment. Laypeople are willing to con-
sider sentences that are not tied to a particular level of culpability, especially
when they are given reasons for thinking that a different or flexible disposition
would make sense and that the crime is not extremely serious. Where serious
crimes such as murder are involved, desert appears to play a much more domi-
nant role for a majority of people, although even in this context evidence that
the offender is no longer a risk can, for a substantial proportion of individuals,
have an effect on the sentence they are willing to impose.
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The empirical desert project's effort to assess lay views about desert and
the effect of the criminal law's divergence from those views is important for
several reasons. First, it provides thought-provoking data for criminal law poli-
cymakers.149 Second, it calls into question the ability of lawmakers to represent
the public's views. 150 Third, and most importantly for our project, it begins to
assess the instrumental value of adhering to desert. Deontological retributivists
are presumably uninterested in this kind of data. But to utilitarians this assess-
ment is crucial, because it helps determine the extent to which desert can be ig-
nored or downplayed in arriving at dispositional decisions.
Empirical desert theory dictates that utilitarians not only try to measure the
deterrent, incapacitative, and rehabilitative impact of punishment but also try to
gauge the extent to which law's allegiance to societal views about desert affect
"crime control," defined broadly in terms of preventing crime, assuring cooper-
ation with the authorities, and reinforcing societal norms. The research Robin-
son has helped conduct suggests a relationship between these desiderata and a
criminal justice system that is based on empirically derived desert. In contrast,
the studies we have reported here tend to undermine all three hypotheses under-
lying empirical desert theory.
The consensus hypothesis is that consensus exists with respect to the rela-
tive ranking of a sizeable subset of crimes such as homicide, assault, and theft
and that this consensus is based on desert considerations. Our research confirms
that consensus about the ranking of core crimes exists, but it also shows that
utilitarian concerns can change that ranking in ways inconsistent with desert.
Moreover, lay views about specific punishments for crime-even for core
crimes-can be multimodal rather than clustered around a mean, indicating
significant disagreement about punishment preferences. This disagreement is
most likely to occur in connection with serious crimes, ironically the only type
of crime whose punishment is predominately driven by desert considerations.
Thus, the consensus that is arguably most important to empirical desert theory
does not exist.
The compliance hypothesis is that punishments that fail to adhere to desert
can undermine the moral credibility of the law, and thus reduce compliance and
cooperation with it. One of our studies suggests, to the contrary, that noncom-
149. See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Sub-
stantive Criminal Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 325 (1996) (stating that Robin-
son and Darley's research in Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Crimi-
nal Law, supra note 21, "certainly could, and probably will, make theorists, especially
adherents of the [Model Penal Code], rethink their positions").
150. See Berman, supra note 34, at 1118 ("[I]f modem American democracy prompts
voters and their representatives to embrace laws that produce and perpetuate obvious injus-
tices, then it would seem our foundational political system has a fundamental flaw that runs
much deeper than any problems that could flow from poorly designed criminal laws.").
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pliance effects are sometimes stronger the closer punishment conforms to
desert-based results, perhaps because people are less worried that commission
of trivial crimes will result in irrational sentences. Our other studies on this top-
ic suggest that, to the extent that noncompliance effects result from criminal
justice outcomes that diverge from societal views, they are as likely when the
divergence is from utilitarian-oriented preferences as from desert-oriented pref-
erences and, in any event, will dissipate quickly over time.
Finally, the crime control hypothesis is that the crime control benefits of a
punishment system based on empirically derived desert are likely to be as great
as or greater than the compliance generated by adhering to dispositions focused
more directly on prevention. Our research does not directly test this hypothesis,
which would be hard to do given the difficulty of measuring the extent of crime
control and its causes. However, the studies testing the compliance hypothesis
(Studies 3, 4A, 4B, and 5) suggest that the crime control hypothesis is false to
the extent that "crime control" is framed solely as the product of compliance
that stems from following lay views about desert-based punishment. Further-
more, Studies 6, 7A, 7B, and 7C suggest that, for all but the most serious
crimes, most people are willing to change their assessments of punishment
from what empirical desert would dictate if they think that preventive goals can
be achieved through different means. Laypeople appear to believe that utilitari-
an considerations are at least as important as desert factors in fashioning sen-
tences in the typical criminal case.
Survey data of the type reported here are always subject to criticism on ex-
ternal validity grounds. In particular, studies testing the compliance hypothesis
(Studies 3, 4A, 4B, and 5) are suspect. People's assertions about their willing-
ness to commit crimes or their unwillingness to cooperate with the authorities
may bear little relationship to whether they will actually commit crimes or fail
to report crimes. 151 Similarly, the punishments assigned by our subjects in
Studies 1, 2, 6, 7A, 7B, and 7C might differ from the punishments the subjects
would impose if they were confronted with the full context of the cases de-
scribed in our brief scenarios.152 The primary response we have to these gener-
alizability concerns is that the research with which we compare our results-
specifically, the research carried out by Robinson and his colleagues and by
Nadler-suffers from the same problems.
The internal validity of these studies can also be criticized on a number of
grounds. We have pointed out many of these concerns throughout this Article.
Future research can try to better isolate the effects of utilitarian and desert
considerations on attitudes toward particular crimes and punishments, the
151. See Nadler, supra note 45, at 1416 & n.75 (stating "we cannot definitively predict
behavior from [self-reports]" and further noting the questionable ethics of research that mo-
tivates illegal behavior (emphasis omitted)).
152. Research confirms that support for prison terms for all but the most serious crimes
decreases markedly when individuals are provided contextual information about the costs
and effectiveness of intermediate sanctions. Cullen et al., supra note 67, at 43-44.
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relationship between these attitudes and fealty to the criminal justice system,
and the extent to which people are willing to abandon desert in service of
preventive goals.
With these caveats, our research suggests that, if crime prevention is the
objective, adherence to empirically derived desert is not likely to be the best
way of achieving it. Even the less concrete goal of bolstering the moral credi-
bility of the criminal justice system might be better pursued by following a
mixture of desert and utilitarian goals. Of course, even if further research con-
firms that following empirically derived desert is not a superior crime preven-
tion mechanism or the best way of shoring up the moral credibility of the crim-
inal justice system, policymakers could still choose to make desert the lodestar
of the criminal law on deontological grounds. The purpose of this Article is
solely to evaluate the utility of desert, not its normative validity.
Furthermore, in assessing the relative merits of a desert- or prevention-
based system, another type of utility, one that this Article has not evaluated,
must also be considered. This second type of utility might be called the political
economy of criminal justice. The choice between retributive and utilitarian
goals in structuring the criminal justice system can not only have an impact on
crime control and legitimization, but can also be driven by budgetary consid-
erations, concerns about implementation, or the extent to which the choice can
insulate the criminal justice system from the vagaries of the political pro-
cess.153
In The Disutility ofInjustice, Robinson and his colleagues allude to this po-
litical economy concern. They describe a number of egregious "crime control"
stories of the type alluded to earlier-life sentences for three minor offenses,
extremely long sentences for possession of small amounts of drugs, tough sen-
tences for strict liability crimes-and suggest that these punishments are not the
product of reasoned judgments by the public and legislators, but rather the re-
sult of media and government distortions of the facts, unreasonable public fear
of crime, and the incentives elections create for legislators to be "tough on
crime."15 4 We tend to agree with this assessment. But by calling these "crime
control" stories, Robinson et al. also imply that a preventive approach to crimi-
nal justice plays into the hands of irrational political forces and that a system
based on empirical (or deontological) desert would avoid these travesties.155 In
153. Cf Richard S. Frase, Theories of Proportionality and Desert, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 131, 135 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin Reitz eds.,
2012) ("[S]pending scarce resources to bring additional charges or impose additional pun-
ishments solely because they are deserved cannot be justified given other pressing needs for
these resources within and outside of the criminal justice system.").
154. Robinson et al., supra note 46, at 1983-94.
155. See id. at 1979-80 (suggesting, in the course of discussing why criminal justice
provisions "are in conflict with the community's shared intuitions of justice," that "while
there may be some latent crime-control concerns present in the public consciousness, . . . in
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other words, the innuendo of The Disutility of Injustice is that, while politics
may make any sensible system of criminal justice difficult to maintain, desert is
more likely than other considerations to curb the worst impulses of the demo-
cratic process. 156
This is not the place to evaluate this controversy at length. But it should at
least be pointed out that desert can also be misused and abused by a dysfunc-
tional political system. Because desert is based on backward-looking assess-
ments of the crime and the offender's mental state, it tends to be implemented
by legislators and prosecutors. Because prevention-at least at the individual
level-is based on forward-looking assessments of treatability and risk, it tends
to be implemented by judges and parole authorities. The first set of
decisionmakers is at least as susceptible as the second to the social and political
pressures of the type described in The Disutility oflnjustice.157
In the end, the best way to reconcile retributive and preventive goals is
probably through some sort of limiting retributivism, or what we are calling
preventive justice, which allows utilitarian considerations to have significant
impact within a range established by retributive principles. 158 But much rides
on the breadth of that range and the rationale for its endpoints. Desert theorists
probably would not be happy with the broad ranges favored by many of our
subjects in the various versions of Study 7. Yet not only are such ranges ap ar-
ently popular, they probably offer the best method of preventing crime.15 In
fact, the public may have been merely 'riding the wave' of concern actuated by a politician's
previous comments").
156. See also Paul H. Robinson et al., Realism, Punishment, and Reform, 77 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1611, 1630 (2010) ("[O]ur program challenges the dominant theory of crime control in
the United States for the past several decades, one based upon intentionally and regularly
doing injustice in the name of general deterrence and incapacitation by its reliance upon doc-
trines like three strikes, high penalties for drug offenses, adult prosecution of juveniles, abo-
lition or narrowing of the insanity defense, the felony murder rule, and the use of strict liabil-
ity." (footnote omitted)).
157. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) (focusing on the pathologies of legislatures and prosecutors);
James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRm. L. REV. 85, 88 (2003) (ask-
ing why "the renaissance of neo-retributivism [has] also been the age of epochally harsh
punishment").
158. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
159. See Joan Petersilia, Calfornia's Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation,
37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 252-53 (2008) ("[Under California's determinate sentencing regime,
a] large percentage of Californians who are nonviolent criminals are accumulating very ex-
tensive criminal records .. . [and yet] may not be any more dangerous than offenders in other
states who are left 'on the street' and successfully handled through an array of community-
based intermediate sanctions. [At the same time], California's sentencing system also releas-
es violent offenders who amass lengthy criminal records-individuals who, in a system more
carefully tailored to protect public safety, probably should not have been released in the first
place."); Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Contribution of Ex-Prisoners to Crime Rates, in
PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 80, 102-03 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher
eds., 2005) (concluding that "expanded use of discretionary parole supervision" would better
protect the public from the safety threat posed by released prisoners); Joanna Shepherd,
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short, unless it represents a radical departure from desert, which is most likely
to occur in cases involving serious crime, indeterminate punishment focused on
prevention is neither likely to cause more noncompliance than it prevents
(through the mechanisms of specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion), nor likely to undermine the legitimacy of the system.
Furthermore, as one of us has argued at length, indeterminate sentencing
within very broad ranges has many other advantages over determinate sentenc-
ing. 160 Even in domains normally thought to be the province of desert-based
systems-including accuracy, protection of offenders' liberty interests, respect
for victims, and saving money-a prevention-oriented regime may well be su-
perior to, or at least no worse than, a system that relies on narrower ranges. 161
In other words, contrary to Robinson and Kurzban's claim, "justice" is not sole-
ly the province of desert.
CONCLUSION
There may be good reasons to base criminal sentences on assessments of
societal views about deserved punishment. But the research reported in this Ar-
ticle suggests that optimizing crime control is not one of them. Previous studies
of empirical desert have greatly advanced discourse on this issue by providing
sophisticated empirical descriptions of how laypeople think about punishment.
But the methodology of these studies has tended to focus subjects on desert,
when in fact people's views about punishment are much more multifaceted and
complicated. No single metric can capture the opinions of the public, and even
within the metric of desert their views vary widely. Thus, a single-minded fo-
cus on adherence to the public's assessments of desert is probably not the best
way of shoring up the moral credibility of the criminal justice system or of
promoting compliance and cooperation with it.
Fortunately, the research reported in this Article suggests that a failure to
track community members' views on punishment does not have a significant or
Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 533, 574 (2007) ("The more mandatory are the guidelines, the larger is the
increase in crime."); cf Yan Zhang et al., Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Mod-
els: A State-Specific Analysis of Their Effects on Recidivism, CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 18 (Dec. 8,
2009), http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2009/12/08/0011128709354047.full.pdf+html
(finding, in a multistate, pre/post study, that determinate sentencing was worse than discre-
tionary parole release at reducing recidivism in New York and North Carolina, better than
discretionary release at reducing reoffending in Maryland and Virginia, no better or worse as
a recidivism-reducing mechanism in Texas and Oregon, and that much depends upon the
specific back-end programs in place).
160. See Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The
Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1127
(2011).
161. See id. at 1154-68; see also Frase, supra note 153, at 144-45 (theorizing that the
persistence of indeterminate sentencing in part "may be due to the widespread support for a
hybrid approach").
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lasting impact on their willingness to be law-abiding citizens. With that in
mind, if crime control is the objective, the criminal justice system might well
be better off pursuing utilitarian goals directly rather than relying on desert as
its linchpin. Empirical desert would still be relevant to fashioning punishment,
but only to the extent it helps set the boundaries beyond which real de-
legitimization of the government and its laws occurs.
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APPENDIX A: SCENARIO PAIRS USED IN STUDIES 1, 2 & 3
The underlined portions in scenarios 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 are the utilitarian manipula-
tions.
PAIR 1
The owner has posted rules at his all-you-can-eat buffet that expressly prohibit
taking food away; patrons can only take what they eat at the buffet. The owner has
set the price of the buffet accordingly. John purchases dinner at the buffet, but
when he leaves he takes with him two whole pies to give to a friend.
John notices in a small family-owned music store a T-shirt with the logo of his
favorite band. While the store clerk is preoccupied with inventory, John places the
fifteen-dollar T-shirt in his coat and walks out, with no intention of paying for it.
After John is caught, he becomes remorseful. He pays the owner for the T-shirt and
apologizes.
PAIR 2
John does not have all the tools he needs for his workshop but knows of a fam-
ily two streets over who sometimes leaves unlocked the door to the detached garage
next to their house. When he next sees his chance, he enters the detached garage
through the unlocked door and takes a medium-size electric drill, intending to keep
it forever. John has previously served time for one other, similar theft.
While a family is on vacation, John jimmies the back door to their house and
steps into their kitchen. On the counter, he sees their microwave, which he carries
away.
PAIR 3
A record store patron is wearing a cap that mocks John's favorite band. John
follows him from the store, confronts him, and then slaps him in the face hard,
causing him to stumble. The man's face develops a harsh black and yellow bruise
that does not go away for some time.
While attending a football game, John becomes angry as he overhears an op-
posing fan's disparaging remarks about John's team. At the end of the game, John
sticks his face in the man's face and head-butts him, causing a black eye and a gash
that requires two stitches to close. John goes home, realizes he acted rashly, and




John demands money from a man buying gas at a gas station. When the man
refuses, John punches the man several times in the face, breaking his jaw and caus-
ing several cuts that each require stitches. He then runs off without getting any
money. He vows to his friends that he will try again.
To force a man to give up his wallet during a robbery attempt, John beats the
man with a club until he relinquishes his wallet, which contains $350. The man
must be hospitalized for two days.
PAIR 5
Two vicious pitbulls that John keeps for illegal dogfighting have just learned to
escape and have attacked a person who came to John's house. The police tell John
that he must destroy the dogs, which he agrees to do but does not intend to do. The
next day, the dogs escape again and maul to death a man delivering a package. John
hides the does from the police and eventually moves to another state where he can
continue to raise pitbulls.
John is driving to see a man about buying an illegal gun but must babysit his
friend's toddler son. It occurs to him that it is too hot to safely leave the toddler in
the car but he decides to leave him anyway and to return soon. He gets talking with
the seller, however, and forgets about the toddler, who passes out and dies.
PAIR 6
John works out a plan to kill his sixty-year-old invalid mother for the inher-
itance. He drags her to her bed, puts her in, and lights her oxygen mask with a ciga-
rette, hoping to make it look like an accident. The elderly woman screams as her
clothes catch fire and she burns to death. John just watches her burn. Doctors con-
sider him a psychopath.
John kidnaps an eight-year-old girl for ransom, rapes her, and then records the
child's screams as he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording to her
parents to induce them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they pay as di-
rected, John strangles the child to death to avoid leaving a witness.
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APPENDIX B: SCENARIOS FOR STUDIES 4A & 4B
The underlined portion is the utilitarian manipulation used in Studies 1, 2, and 3, and
continued in these studies. The unbracketed sentence term is the average sentence imposed
by the control group in Study I and given to the control group in Study 4A and the second
experimental group in Study 4B. The first bracketed sentence term was given to the experi-
mental groups in Study 4A. The second bracketed sentence term was given to the experi-
mental groups in Study 4B.
John notices a T-shirt with the logo of his favorite band in a small family-
owned music store. While the store clerk is preoccupied with inventory, John plac-
es the fifteen-dollar T-shirt in his coat and walks out, with no intention of paying
for it. After John is caunht. he becomes remorseful. He pays the owner for the T-
shirt and apologizes. He is given a two-month [ten-year] [twenty-year] sentence.
John does not have all the tools he needs for his workshop but knows of a fam-
ily two streets over who sometimes leave unlocked the door to the detached garage
next to their house. When he next sees his chance, he enters the detached garage
through the unlocked door and takes a medium-size electric drill, intending to keep
it. John has previously served time for one other, similar theft. He is given a two-
year [six-month] [one-day] sentence.
While attending a football game, John becomes angry as he overhears an op-
posing fan's disparaging remarks about John's team. At the end of the game, John
sticks his face in the man's face and head-butts him, causing a black eye and a gash
that requires two stitches to close. John goes home, realizes he acted rashly, and
signs up for an anger-management therapy program that he successfully completes.
John receives a six-month [fifteen-year] [thirty-year] sentence.
John demands money from a man buying gas at a gas station. When the man
refuses, John punches the man several times in the face, breaking his jaw and caus-
ing several cuts that each require stitches. He then runs off without getting any
money. He vows to his friends that he will try again. John receives a three-year
[one-year] [one-month] sentence.
Two vicious pitbulls that John keeps for illegal dogfighting have just learned to
escape and have attacked a person who came to John's house. The police tell John
he must destroy the dogs, which he agrees to do but does not intend to do. The next
day, the dogs escape again and maul to death a man delivering a package. John
hides the does from the police and eventually moves to another state where he can
continue to raise pitbulls. He receives a ten-year [five-year] [one-year] sentence.
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John works out a plan to kill his sixty-year-old invalid mother for the inher-
itance. He drags her to her bed, puts her in, and lights her oxygen mask with a ciga-
rette, hoping to make it look like an accident. The elderly woman screams as her
clothes catch fire and she bums to death. John just watches her burn. Doctors con-
sider him a psychopath. He receives a fifty-year [ten-year] [two-year] sentence.
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APPENDIX C: SCENARIOS FOR STUDIES 6, 7A, 7B & 7C
George Smith has served sentences for grand theft auto and burglary. Ten months after
completing his second sentence, Smith stole three golf clubs, priced at $399 apiece. Smith
was convicted of grand theft, his third felony.
Study 6 [Experimental group manipulation]:
Once sentenced, Smith will be required to participate in a newly developed one-year re-
habilitative program that has been shown to reduce offending by burglars and other types of
thieves. Indicate the sentence you would impose and the percentage, if any, of that sentence
that could take place in the community under close supervision by probation officers. [Thirty
dispositional options available.] 162
Study 7A [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
I to 7 years in prison (depending on how well Smith responds to treatment)
6 to 7 years in prison (regardless of how well Smith responds to treatment)
Study 7B [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
1 to 10 years in prison (depending on how well Smith responds to treatment)
6 to 9 years in prison (regardless of how well Smith responds to treatment)
Study 7C [All subjects given the following information and options after being given
the treatment information from Study 6]:
Smith does not complete the program, and at the end of the prison term that you elected,
correctional experts conclude that he will continue to steal if released. Should Smith be re-
leased at the end of the term you imposed above? Or would you extend Smith's term and, if
so, by how much? Please indicate your answer below.
Release at end of prison term indicated above
Detain until experts indicate no longer a threat
Extend term by the following number of years
162. See supra note 70 for a description of the options. The same dispositional options
were used for all of the Study 6 scenarios.
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In most states, driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol or drugs is a crime. Darren
has been convicted of his third DUI offense, based on overconsumption of alcohol.
Study 6 [Experimental group manipulation]:
Once sentenced, he will be required to undergo an innovative six-month substance-
abuse treatment program that eliminates alcohol cravings. Indicate the sentence you would
impose and the percentage, if any, of that sentence that could take place in the community
under close supervision by probation officers. [Thirty dispositional options available.]
Study 7A [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
6 months to 5 years in prison (depending on how well Darren responds to treat-
ment)
4 to 5 years in prison (regardless of how well Darren responds to treatment)
Study 7B [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
6 months to 5 years in prison (depending on how well Darren responds to treat-
ment)
3 to 5 years in prison (regardless of how well Darren responds to treatment)
Study 7C [All subjects given the following information and options after being given
the treatment information from Study 6]:
Darren fails to complete the program, and his treatment team concludes that Darren will
continue to drink and will probably drive while drunk again. Should Darren be released at
the end of the term you imposed above? Or would you extend the term and, if so, until ex-
perts indicate he is no longer a threat, or by a certain number of years? Please indicate your
answer below.
Release at end of prison term indicated above
Detain until experts indicate no longer a threat
Extend term by the following number of years
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When Sam Jones was age sixteen, he and three other school-age youths attempted to
rob a restaurant, causing a head injury requiring stitches to the manager. Jones served a
twelve-month sentence, and was then released. Less than six months later, when he was sev-
enteen, Jones participated in a home invasion robbery. He and two others forcibly entered
the home of the victim, held a pistol to his chest, and ransacked the home for money, but
found only afew hundred dollars. These are the only two crimes Jones has committed.
Study 6 [Experimental group manipulation]:
Once sentenced, Jones will be required to undergo an innovative four-month rehabilita-
tion program that involves family and peers and that has been shown to reduce violent of-
fending. Indicate the sentence you would impose and the percentage, if any, of that sentence
that could take place in the community under close supervision by probation officers. [Thirty
dispositional options available.]
Study 7A [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
6 months in a community-treatment program to 5 years in prison (depending on
how well Jones responds to treatment)
4 to 5 years in prison (regardless of how well Jones responds to treatment)
Study 7B [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
6 months in the community-treatment program to 10 years in prison (depending
on how well Jones responds to treatment)
5 to 7 years in prison (regardless of how well Jones responds to treatment)
Study 7C [All subjects given the following information and options after being given
the treatment information from Study 6]:
Jones successfully completes the program and correctional experts conclude that he no
longer poses a risk to the community. Should he be released now (after six months in the
system)? Should he serve out the remainder of the term you imposed above? Or should the
sentence be something different? Please indicate your answer below.
Release Jones now
Detain Jones until term indicated above is completed
Change sentence to the following 163
163. In the actual survey, subjects who chose to change the sentence were given several
lines on which to provide their answer.
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Donovan is a drug addict. On three occasions he has been arrested for grabbing a
woman's purse. He uses the money to obtain drugs. After each previous conviction he re-
ceived a short period of imprisonment and then returned to the street. After release from his
third jail term he once again steals a woman's purse, this time knocking her down. The
woman requires three stitches to her forehead. He is convicted and now awaits sentencing.
Study 6 [Experimental group manipulation]:
Once released from his sentence, he will be required to undergo a new "drug court"
program that involves treatment and close supervision in the community and re-incarceration
if he uses drugs again. Indicate the sentence you would impose and the percentage, if any, of
that sentence that could take place in the community under close supervision by probation
officers. [Thirty dispositional options available.]
Study 7A [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
1 to 6 years (depending on how well Donovan responds to treatment)
5 to 6 years (regardless of how well Donovan responds to treatment)
Study 7B [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
1 to 10 years (depending on how well Donovan responds to treatment)
5 to 7 years (regardless of how well Donovan responds to treatment)
Study 7C [All subjects given the following information and options after being given
the treatment information from Study 6]:
Donovan successfully completes the program, and drug court authorities declare that he
is now eligible for release by drug authorities on the condition that he continue to undergo
drug testing every month. Should he be released on this condition? Or should he complete
the sentence you imposed above? Please indicate your answer below.
Released on condition of monthly drug testing
Detain until term indicated above is completed
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David Johnson is the mayor of a moderately sized city and is charged with deciding be-
tween competing bids for the management of a youth-detention facility. Company A has
submitted the lowest bid and is a reputable company that provides services to numerous oth-
er cities in the state. However, Company B's CEO recently visited Johnson and offered him
$5000 in exchange for awarding the contract to his company, which has a long record of




Study 7A (Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
10 years probation in the community to 6 years in prison (depending on John-
son's conduct during the 10 years)
5 to 6 years in prison (regardless of Johnson's subsequent conduct)
Study 7B [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
1 year probation in the community to 10 years in prison (depending on John-
son's conduct during the 10 years)
5 to 7 years in prison (regardless of Johnson's subsequent conduct)
Study 7C [All subjects given the following information and options after being given
the treatment information from Study 6]:
Once convicted, Johnson offers to return the $5000. He also pledges $20,000 to the city,
commits to working in community-outreach programs for juveniles for the next six years,
and swears he has learned his lesson. Assuming all of this to be genuine, would it change the
sentence you imposed above? Please indicate your answer below.
Release
Serve out sentence imposed above
The new sentence should be: 164
164. Subjects who chose to change the sentence were given several lines on which to
provide their answer. The same is true for the final question on the following survey.
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A woman at work reveals Mark Foster's misdeeds to his employer, thereby getting him
fired. Foster devises a plan to get even with her. The next week he forces the woman into his
car at knfe point and drives her to a secluded area where he shoots her to death. Foster is
convicted and sentenced to prison. By the end of his third year there he has experienced a
religious conversion, renounces violence, and provides restitution to the family.
Study 6:
Not applicable
Study 7A [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
3 to 50 years in prison (depending on whether Foster's conversion is genuine)
48 to 50 years in prison (regardless of Foster's character)
Study 7B [Both control and experimental groups given these options]:
3 to 50 years in prison (depending on whether Foster's conversion is genuine)
45 to 50 years (regardless of Foster's character)
Study 7C [All subjects given the following information and options after being given
the treatment information from Study 6]:
By the end of his third year there Foster has experienced a religious conversion, re-
nounces violence, and provides restitution to the family. Assuming Foster is genuine, should
he be released, serve out the term you imposed above, or receive a different sentence? Please
indicate your answer below.
Release
Serve out sentence imposed above
The new sentence should be:
[Vol. 65:77134
January 2013] 135PUT7TING DESERT IN ITS PLA CE
APPENDIX D: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Demographic Studies 1, Studies Studies Study 5 Study 7C
Characteristics 2,3 & 6 4A & 7A 4B & 7B (n = 141) (n = 68)
(n = 530) (n = 236) (n = 289)
Gender Female 193 (37%) 120(51%) 163 (56%) 78 (56%) 38(56%)
Male 337(63%) 116(49%) 126 (44%) 63(44%) 30(44%)
Race African Amer. 28(5%) 12(5%) 25 (9%) 13 (9%) 0(0%)
White 451(85%) 128 (54%) 211(73%) 98 (70%) 64 (94%)
Latino/a 16(3%) 12(5%) 19(7%) 18(13%) 4(6%)
Other 35 (7%) 84(33%) 34(12%) 12 (8%) 0 (0%)
Age (yrs.) Mean Age 46.7 32.2 31.8 24.4 37.4
Political Republican 140(26%) 59(25%) 53 (18%) 43(30%) 22(32%)
Party Democrat 174(33%) 99(42%) 114(39%) 53 (38%) 28(41%)
Independent 170(32%) 52(22%) 88(30%) 45 (32%) 18(27%)
Other 46(9%) 26 (11%) 34 (12%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Income 0-10,000 41(8%) 21(9%) 18 (6%) 85(60%) 0(0%)
($ per 10,001-25,000 67(13%) 28(12%) 42(14%) 35(25%) 3 (4%)
year) 25,001-35,000 54(10%) 45 (19%) 52 (18%) 15(11%) 5(7%)
35,001-50,000 87(16%) 38 (16%) 65(22%) 6 (4%) 18(27%)
50,001-75,000 143 (27%) 52 (24%) 57 (20%) 0 (0%) 18 (27%)
75,001-100,000 73(14%) 28(12%) 31(11%) 0(0%) 20(29%)
100,000 + 65 (12%) 24 (8%) 24(8%) 0(0%) 4 (6%)
Education No H.S. Dipl. 7 (1%) 11(5%) 10(3%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
H.S. Dipl. 64 (12%) 22 (9%) 24(8%) 0(0%) 5 (7%)
Partial Col. 144(27%) 61(26%) 102 (35%) 0(0%) 8 (12%)
Associate Deg. 63 (12%) 12(5%) 17(6%) 0(0%) 2(3%)
Bachelor Deg. 156(30%) 82(35%) 96(33%) 121 (85%) 38(56%)
Graduate or 96(18%) 48(20%) 40 (14%) 20(15%) 15(22%)
Prof'1 Deg.
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